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	 China and Russia have increased their pursuit of using cyber-attacks as an 
offensive tool in overall state strategy. China pursues passive cyber-attacks while 
Russia pursues active cyber-attacks. This study intends to answer the question: what 
factors encourage China and Russia to pursue differing cyber-attack strategies? A 
review of the current literature reveals that four primary factors influence cyber 
strategy: economic incentive, international hierarchy, institutional organization, and 
state interpretation of deterrence. These four factors are analyzed through policy 
analysis, using documents from NGOs, and government documents from the US, 
China and Russia. The results conclude that each factor contributes significantly to 
cyber-strategy; however, state interpretation of deterrence is the only factor that 
adequately explains China's and Russia’s choices in determining cyber strategy. The 
study discusses the implications of these findings and possible areas for further 
research. 
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Introduction 
	 The state embraced the internet during the Cold War to secure itself by 
providing an interconnected system capable of withstanding nuclear destruction. 
Paradoxically, it has created new threats since these new cyber capabilities have 
opened new spaces in which states and their institutions are now vulnerable. The state 
has embraced cyber capabilities to increase its efficiency and effectiveness without 
anticipating the risks that online exposure creates. Cyber attacks have become a tool 
of offence, exploiting the vulnerabilities in rival state's systems. This use of cyber 
attacks has become a new normal in international relations, with states using cyber 
capabilities to survey, sabotage, and steal from their rival states. 

	 When the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET, precursor 
to the internet) was first conceived in 1966, the Unites States (US) was a global 
hegemon, challenged by the Soviet Union. Today, the US maintains its hegemon status 
but faces challenges by two rival states: China and a resurgent Russia. Both states 
seek to reduce US hegemony to reshape the world order to their benefits. They each 
have embraced cyber technology after significant hesitation due to communist ruling 
ideology and are heavily investing in their cyber capabilities, trying to use this 
technology in the most effective way to help gain an advantage against their American 
rival. However, Russia and China are using their newly found cyber capabilities in 
inherently different ways, through active and passive cyber attacks. Russia engages in 
more "active" attacks against their foe than a typical state. An "active attack" is a 
cyber-attack specifically designed to disrupt or damage the recipient state. However, 
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China favours "passive" cyber attacks, which primarily focus on information collection 
and internal monitoring of the attack's victim. This proposed the question: Why do both 
states use their offensive cyber capabilities so differently when facing a similar threat? I 
hypothesize that China and Russia’s fundamental interpretation of conventional 
deterrence influences how cyber attacks are used in both countries. 

	 In this study, I will examine the predominant factors in determining cyber-attack 
strategy. These four factors: economic incentives, international hierarchy, institutional 
organization, and interpretation of deterrence, provide a well-rounded analysis of the 
motivations behind the strategy of cyber attacks. The reasons for comparison is that 
these two states are the primary challengers to US global hegemony, both are non-
democratic, both have a similar history of communist ideology, and both challenge the 
US throughout the latter half of the 20th century. This analysis will provide a 
comparison since China and Russia are the most prolific in reported cyber attacks 
against the US and NATO allies. Few other countries challenge the US, and even fewer 
with sophisticated cyber capabilities can attack the US. China and Russia are the only 
two states outside of NATO influence that can carry out multiple, long-term cyber 
operations. Iran and North Korea have fewer capabilities than either China or Russia. 
They remain relatively isolated from the international community as opposed to China 
and Russia, which are integrated and are two of the five permanent votes on the UN 
Security Council. China and Russia have key similarities, but their differences in cyber 
strategy are what I will be highlighting. 

	 This study will provide insight into how states determine their offensive cyber 
strategies, whether they focus on active or passive attacks. This can infer how states 
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might engage cyber attacks in the future. It will also illuminate different factors behind 
decision making in a cyber capable world and provide the basis upon which such 
attacks can be anticipated, and the effects mitigated. Current research focuses on the 
conceptual ontology of cyber attacks or specific attack case studies.  This research will 
contribute to the limited literature on cyber strategies by introducing a policy analysis 
framework rarely done due to its historical novelty of cyber attacks in the state security 
realm.

Basics of Cyber Conflict  
	 Due to the novelty of cyber operations, there is still debate on the terminology of 
cyber capabilities. When analyzing cyber strategy, there must be a precise terminology 
so that there is a clear line delineating what consists of a cyber "attack." The 
terminology of what a cyber-attack consists of is itself under review by several authors. 
Valeriano (2015) argues that offensive cyber operations are distinguished between 
attacks and operations. Attacks are sophisticated attempts to breach the security of a 
computerized system. An example of an "attack" would be Russian attempts to 
compromise voting registration records in the 2019 US midterm elections. Operations 
are an attempt to breach security using the user's ignorance to the offensive actor's 
advantage. An example of an operation would be the Russian 2016 Democratic 
National Convention (DNC) hacks, which targeted an individual (John Podesta) to 
unknowingly give his password to cyber operatives, which then were used to gain 
access to DNC documents. Authors such as Carr (2012) and Reveron (2012) do not 
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distinguish these two types of offensive cyber operations due to problems of discovery, 
attribution, and response problems. In this research, I will adhere to Valeriano's 
definitions and maintain analysis of cyber "attacks" rather than the simpler cyber 
operations. 

	 A significant issue facing states when determining cyber strategy is the problem 
of attribution. No cyber-attack, be it passive or active, can be attributed to a specific 
actor with 100% certainty (Reveron, 2012). Attribution creates a large amount of leeway 
for states in creating a cyber-attack strategy since there is a high chance that the 
attacking actor can attack without repercussions. The culprits can be inferred through 
investigation, but proving beyond doubt is utterly impossible due to the nature of 
computing (This problem of attribution increases uncertainty since nobody can 
effectively blame another actor for a cyber-attack.). Reinforcing a norm of non-
conventional response since no state wants to appear to attack another with 
conventional military capabilities without justified cause (Clausewitz, 1832). Trying to 
determine attribution through the timeline of attacks can also be uncertain due to the 
sources provided and when the attack is discovered; often, cyber attacks can go 
weeks or months without detection (Mandiant Report, 2014). When regarding the theft 
of intelligence, there can be little indication besides leaking the information that a theft 
took place. The problem of attribution creates a high incentive for the state to pursue 
passive cyber attacks due to the low chance of discovery, while also closing the 
information gaps that cyber conflict inherently presents. 

	 No cyber-attack has merited a conventional military response from the 
defending state (Carr, 2012; Berghel 2017). The first reported cyber attack was carried 
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out by the Americans by allegedly sabotaging a piece of pipeline equipment, which 
used primitive programming to overload the pressure valve, causing a massive 
explosion (Carr, 2012). This attack remains unverified since both the Soviet Union and 
the US denied this ever taking place. However, there is enough compelling evidence to 
infer that this was the first known instance of a "cyber" attack (Rid, 2012). This attack 
merited no conventional response from the Soviet Union. More recently, we can see 
this norm of non-conventional response continued in both the passive cyber attack 
"Titan Rain" carried out by China on US military infrastructure, and the active cyber 
attack "Stuxnet" which destroyed Iranian nuclear equipment (Mandiant Report, 2014; 
Lindsay, 2013; Rid, 2012; Austin, 2014). This norm is established today with all 
countries even though some states threaten conventional responses, but none have 
followed through (Valeriano, 2015). The norm is also due to the constant inflow of cyber 
attacks that states receive. Most states are being attacked by state and non-state 
actors constantly, to the point of singling out all but the most severe attacks are 
incredibly difficult (Carr, 2012; Reveron, 2012). Most of these attacks are benign and 
are testing weaknesses within the state for further exploitation (Mandiant Report, 
2014). However, this constant cyber conflict between state, non-state and regional 
actors has solidified the norm of non-conventional response even in the face of 
physically destructive active cyber attacks, creating an incentive to use cyber attacks. 
It creates an inherently low-risk strategy with the potential for comparatively high 
rewards due to the norm of non-conventional response. 	 

	 Finally, the last major issue regarding cyber capabilities is that of the offensive 
advantage. Cyber capabilities have a natural offensive advantage due to technological 
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innovation (Carr, 2012; Reveron, 2013). Cyber attacks can only be used once or twice, 
then the defender (if they have realized the attack) will learn how the attack happened 
and defend itself against it. However, these defensive actions will only protect against 
the previously obsolete attack. The fast-paced nature of technological innovation gives 
the advantage to the attacker. It is not realistic for a state or region to effectively 
monitor all internet and computer traffic; therefore, they must hoard their resources to 
protect their most vulnerable assets. These defensive capabilities must be used 
sparingly due to logistical limitations; consequently, the attacker can always find new 
vulnerable areas or exploit previously unseen flaws. Due to the nature of cyber attacks, 
and their reliance on exploiting flaws within programming, defenders often do not know 
what resources they must prioritize (Carr, 2012). This offensive advantage contributes 
to cyber attack strategy since a state cannot invest too many resources in a single 
attack or defensive strategies, since it has a one-use limitation, and often unreliable in 
its success. When pursuing an active attack, this one-use policy is very relevant as the 
likelihood of discovery is far higher than passive attacks that can go undetected for 
months or years. 

	 Basis of Comparison 

China and Russia have unique history and circumstances which formed their cyber 
strategies, but they also have some key commonalities. China's cybersecurity realm 
has been expanding rapidly since the early 2000s. The opening of China to world trade 
in the 1990s exposed China's lack of technological progress compared to the West. 
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China did not have an official cybersecurity policy until 2006 and created an 
independent branch of government for cyber concerns in 2014 (Lei 2016; Austin, 
2014). However, this has not stopped other branches of the Chinese Security Forces 
from engaging in cyber attacks against states since 2003 (Mandiant Report 2014; 
Austin, 2014). Over the past decade, Chinese cyber capacity has grown exponentially, 
and an accurate estimation of their capacity is hard to determine. Currently, China's 
cyber-attack strategy has been focused on passive attacks, engaging in intelligence 
operations (Cheng, 2018; Fravel, 2018). This does not discount that Chinese actors 
have engaged in active cyber attacks. In more recent years, China is slowly breaking 
out of passive attack strategy and has pursued more active cyber attacks. Its strategy 
remains primarily reliant on passive attacks. Stealing information for the benefit of the 
state rather than interfering with a rival state's capacity.  

	 Russia's cyber strategy has changed rapidly over the past ten years, mostly due 
to the increase in the state's cyber capabilities. Russia feared the embrace of computer 
technology during the final years of the Soviet Union, due to the loss of social control 
this technology would introduce (Lunde, 2014. Bolt, 2018). This lack of investment hit 
Russia hard when it transitioned to a capitalist economy, following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. This state-sponsored ignorance caused Russia to fall behind in the cyber 
realm, with only the military having access to basic computers for logistics (Austin, 
2014). Only in 2000, once Vladimir Putin became president, did the government 
actively engage in expanding the cyber capacity of the state and its citizens (Lunde, 
2014; UK National Cyber Security Center, 2018; US Department of Defense, 2018). 
What makes Russia unique in its cyber strategy is its use of information and 
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propaganda warfare to interfere in critical state infrastructure. Russian attacks include 
attacks on the Ukrainian, US, and UK elections (Bolt, 2018; Lunde, 2014; Klimburg, 
2011). These attacks include hacking and releasing harmful documents or active cyber 
attacks to the institutions of democracy (voting records/registration)(Bolt, 2018; 
Whitehouse, 2016). Some of these attacks are difficult to classify. Some could be 
considered hybrid attacks, especially those which pursue disinformation campaigns. 
These attacks do not engage by destroying the systems they attack in the traditional 
method of active cyber attacks, but still cause significant damage to the defending 
country. They are designed to gain information and weaken the target and focus on 
internal dissension and polarization rather than challenge Russian influence. However, 
for this study's purposes, I will focus on their active attack strategy, which remains 
Russia's dominant cyber strategy.

	 This study's goal is to identify the determining factors as to why a state 
favours an active or passive cyber strategy. There is a crucial difference between 
China and Russia in its cyber strategy. Russia favours active attacks while China 
maintains a passive based cyber strategy.

 
Organization of the Research 

	 The first step will be defining my conceptual frameworks through a literature 
review. Information collection will be through public documents provided by states, 
NGOs and think tanks, and private security company documents (Mandiant Report, 
2014), which will be available in a separate appendix. Currently, there are translated 
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documents from China, Russia, which describe their countries' cyber policy. The 
trustworthiness of the state documents from Russia and China is often unreliable and 
will need secondary sources to confirm or disprove the official policy. This study will be 
structured in four major parts, first beginning with a literature review of the current 
content on cyber strategies and their relations to Russia and China. The second 
section will outline the research design and methodology. Third, I will move on to a 
discussion of the results and analysis. I will finish with a concluding section that will 
highlight the research findings and possible further research.

	 I will compare both these states through the four major contributing factors that 
determine the cyber attack strategy: economic incentives, international hierarchy, 
committed resources and interpretation of deterrence. For economic incentives, there 
are three possible indicators, the prevalence of economic targets, the economic policy, 
and if there is a direct net benefit to the attacking state. International hierarchy has the 
indicators of state isolation from the international community, reliance on international 
trade, and ongoing territorial disputes. In the analysis of committed resources, the 
three indicators are publicly allocated funds, organizational structure, and human 
capital availability. While committed resources create a problem of endogeny, it will be 
a factor of analysis since there are indicators outside of strategic policy that determines 
allocated resources. Finally, to analyze deterrence policy, I will use the indicator of a 
state's accepted definition of deterrence, perceived conventional and non-conventional 
threat to the respective state and response, and publicly acknowledged cyber attacks 
against the respective state. These indicators for comparison will provide an extensive 
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overview of the main motivating factors driving a state to pursue an active versus 
passive cyber strategy.

	 This study will expand the limited literature on cyber conflict, and update the 
preconceived knowledge to reflect better the expanded capabilities of cyber conflict. It 
will delve into the analysis of the strategy of cyber conflict, rather than debate the 
conceptual nature of cyber attacks generally. While this study only looks at two states, 
it will contribute to the ongoing debate in political science about the nature of these 
newly formed cyber capabilities. By determining the major contributing factor of the 
formation of cyber strategy, one can apply the conclusions to other states and 




	 The significant gap within the literature is that there are few concrete 
explanations as to what factors determine a state's cyber attack strategies between 
passive and active attacks. This gap is due to the clandestine nature of cyber 
capabilities, and there is little policy analysis on state actions regarding overall cyber 
strategy. The focus of analysis in cyber strategy tends to either be on individual attack 
case studies (i.e. Stuxnet or Fancybear), or ontological analysis of the concept of 
“cyber,’”cyberwar,” and attack classification (Rid, 2011; Stone, 2012). Is there a central 
motivating factor that supersedes all others when determining how a state determines 
its cyber strategy between primarily active and passive attacks? There is an apparent 
attempt by countries like Russia and China to present a picture of their cybersecurity 
policies as purely defensive. Yet, both states do engage in offensive cyber attacks that 
violate their own declared mandates. The base division between cyber-attack 
strategies is between active and passive cyber attacks. Russia pursues the former 
while China relies on the latter. Why do these two states pursue different cyber 
strategies?  
	 The difficulty within the literature is that most policy analysis provide a biased 
perspective on non-western states that assume western forms of division, control, and 
redundancy. Organizations in the US often silo cyber capabilities, and there is a clear 
delineation between civilian and military organizations. This often results in specific 
branches of government focusing on passive attacks (i.e. intelligence groups) and 
active attacks (i.e. military organizations). In Russia and China, the division is far less 
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pronounced. Russia has no clearly defined civilian intelligence services or cyber 
departments. The closest would be the Federal Security Service (FSB); however, they 
engage in both internal and external intelligence and military work (Cross, 2018). In 
China, they have an established Chinese intelligence service and cyber operations. 
However, they also have been prone to using civilian organizations such as the 
University of Shanghai to engage in foreign intelligence gathering (Fravel, 2019; 
Mandiant Report, 2014). This difference in approach creates difficulty when analyzing 
these institutions from an outside perspective. 

Fundamental Debates in Cyber Ontology 

	 There are several concurrent debates and problems which face policy analysts 
in confronting the new cyber frontier. The literature around cyber attacks and cyber 
capabilities is currently dealing with a major debate as to what "cyber" consists of and 
if cyber capabilities open up a new theatre of conflict, similar to the introduction of 
airpower in the early 20th century. There are scholars like Rid (2012) who argued in his 
piece that cyber capabilities are merely an enhancement of currently established 
intelligence capabilities rather than a tool for large scale conflict. He goes through a 
case by case basis of the major cyber attacks that took place before 2011. In his case 
by case analysis, he concludes cyber capabilities are most effective when used as an 
intelligence tool, and have proven relatively ineffective in more convention conflict 
settings. Rid’s (2012) analysis focuses on the use of cyber attacks that are usually 
classified as "passive." Valeriano (2015) continues this argument in his book, 
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distinguishing specific passive cyber attacks as "cyber operations" rather than 
including them in cyber attacks. Valeriano (2015) comes to a similar conclusion that 
cyber capabilities are most effective when applied to intelligence gathering 
capabilities. 

	 However, this debate is far from settled. Some notable academics, such as 
Stone (2013), argue that cyber capabilities introduce a new concept for the battlefield. 
He argues that the vulnerabilities that states face by integrating themselves into the 
online infrastructure present significant vulnerabilities. Essential state functions rely on 
the internet, and through cyber attacks, can be brought to a standstill. These types of 
cyber attacks are classified primarily as "active" cyber attacks. An example of this is 
the "Bronze Soldier" attack in Estonia, which crippled the country's internet 
infrastructure for three days (Lunde, 2014). Stone (2013) argues that these capabilities, 
combined with conventional warfare, create a new frontier of conflict that directly 
attacks the homeland, causing a state to lose the ability to conduct a war effectively. 
McGraw (2012) also argues that the cyber realm has opened a new frontier of possible 
conflict and argues that the vulnerabilities presented would be a likely target if a large 
scale state-to-state conflict occurred. McGraw (2012) argues the need for a new 
priority on securing these online vulnerabilities to prevent such a cyber conflict from 
ever occurring. While these debates are interesting, they miss significant elements of 
analysis by arguing about the categorization of "cyber" as a concept and its use, rather 
than breaking down the motivation of how cyber is used strategically and the factors 
behind the possible difference in strategy.
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Strategy and Cyber Attacks  
 
	 The first major concept to define is "strategy," explicitly concerning state 
offensive action. Defining strategy is required since there is a possibility of variation in 
interpretation based on the specific state. The Chinese National Defence University 
defines strategy as: "a sovereign states relatively long term, comprehensive plans and 
guidelines for a … state to use its capabilities to pursue national interests in the 
international struggle" (Cheng, 2017, p 343.) Monaghan (2013) outlines that Russia 
defines its strategy, like China, not simply in militaristic terms but "encompasses a 
more global [connotation], reflecting the attainment of the state's wider aims by 
whatever means are considered the most expedient" (Monaghan, 2013, p 1224). 

	 Both of these definitions of state strategy overlap, and essentially are congruous 
with exceptions in diction, not meaning. There is a consensus of using all means 
necessary to accomplish long-term state goals. How a state uses these capabilities is 
up to its interpretation, and China and Russia have significantly different state goals 
outside of the preservation of the state. Russia perceives itself as a bridge between 
two continents and two cultures (Lunde, 2014; Cross, 2018). Constantly under threat 
from both sides, with wide expanses of land and peoples to protect and maintain 
control. However, China sees itself as more secure, considering itself the "middle 
kingdom," a centre of power and culture, unified against any external aggressor 
(Fravel, 2018; Cheng 2019). Even with these differences, there is a significant overlap 
as to how each state interprets strategy. 
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	 Cyber attacks are used for general state strategy to accomplish long-term 
national interests in the international system. These cyber capabilities are still novel in 
the international community, and states are now pursuing consistent strategies to help 
their overall national goals. National goals are divided into three primary groups: 
military, economic and political (Weber, 2018). Cyber attacks can help contribute to a 
state’s ability to achieve all of these potential goals. The fundamental division of cyber 
attacks is active cyber attacks and passive cyber attacks. Each has its specific 
advantages and disadvantages, but neither seems to have an overall advantage in 
helping achieve a state pursue its military, economic or political goals. Therefore, what 
other factors might explain the difference in how states approach their cyber strategy? 

Cyber Attacks: Passive versus Active 
	 Passive cyber attacks attempt to gain access and information with no residual 
effects on the system, whereas active cyber attacks attempt to change the structure or 
operations of the recipient network (Uma, 2013; Kramer, 2009). This terminology is 
from the intelligence community about their forms of operations. Intelligence would 
have "active" and "passive" operations with similar definitions. Active intelligence 
operations engage and attempt to sabotage or modify an existing institution, while 
passive is information gathering. Overall, passive attacks tend to outnumber active 
attacks by a large margin since the risks of discovery are far less, and inherent costs 
lower than active cyber attacks. Since both intelligence and the cyber community 
contain a substantial overlap with this adoption of intelligence taxonomy, active cyber 
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attacks can cripple infrastructure by overloading the networks, stopping the network's 
ability to communicate with itself, and the surrounding connected networks. A prime 
example is the Russian attacks on Georgia in 2008, where denial of service attacks 
crippled the government's websites and communication networks during the Russian 
sponsored campaign (Carr, 2012; UK Government, 2008). Denial of Service attack is a 
method of active cyber-attack that intentionally flood the targeted program with 
information, causing the system to either crash or shut itself down. These attacks 
hindered the governments ability to communicate with its citizens and defence 
networks, allowing Russia to invade its disputed territory with a coordinated response. 
Passive attacks include primarily reconnaissance attacks, traffic analysis and the 
acquisition of private message content (Uma, 2013). This form of attack is used mainly 
in coordination with intelligence services to aid in their information gathering. An 
example of a passive attack would be China's "Operation Aurora," which targeted 
Google and Adobe, along with several other silicon valley companies, to gain access to 
protected confidential information (Google, 2010; CSIS 2020). This attack was 
discovered and still managed to access several email accounts of Chinese human 
rights activists. These examples of cyber attacks demonstrate each respective state's 
concept of strategic by using any means available to accomplish their overall goals. 
With Russia, it is attempting to maintain their state by attacking outside threats to 
distract them away from Russian interests. However, China is attempting to increase its 
technological prowess not only to maintain the state but to increase their relative power 
with rival international states. 
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	 The line between passive and active attacks can be slightly blurred. When 
pursuing a passive cyber attack for information gathering against an institution, the 
leaking of information can cause similar damage to the institution as a well-placed 
active cyber attack. The prime example of this situation was the 2016 DNC hack, which 
resulted in the release of senior democratic figures' private emails during an election 
campaign (CSIS, 2020; US Treasury, 2018). While this attack did not cause any 
sabotage to the networks used, it created incredible damage in the institution the 
network served. This leaking of classified information was technically passive in its 
characteristics; however, the results of this form of a cyber attack can result in far more 
damage than a single attack taking down an email server. The broad terminology does 
allow exceptions and muddled boundaries. Still, it remains the most precise way of 
classifying cyber attacks without specifying the specific forms of programs required to 
carry out such an attack. It also remains a clear form of classifying cyber attacks that 
have not had conclusive investigations on their network failures, which resulted in such 
an attack. This form of classification is based on the results of the attacks rather than 
the programming (Uma, 2013). With this blurring of concepts, it still demonstrates that 
both China and Russia are using tools at their disposal to accomplish state strategies. 	 	 

	 Active and Passive cyber attacks are the predominant strategy; there is 
significant usage of hybrid strategies. Defining these hybrid strategies is difficult due to 
the scope of the analysis. Are disinformation campaigns a hybrid strategy? It depends 
on the level of analysis pursued. The technology used to pursue disinformation 
campaigns is often simple and falls under passive attack strategy since the goal is not 
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to disrupt the program itself. However, the resultant devastation of engaging in 
disinformation campaigns can cause similar results to an active cyber attack. 
Disinformation campaigns are not inherently difficult, since actors often use tools 
already available to the public to target specific groups of vulnerable people. These 
tools are used similarly to advertisers. Specifically, websites like Facebook and Twitter 
pride themselves on providing user-friendly advertising and demographic targeting 
tools which can be exploited by nefarious actors. This form of cyber attack strategy is 
difficult to classify since nothing systemically was attacked; it is merely tools available 
to the public being used in ways the creators never intended. There is also a significant 
difference from some scholars between kinetic and cyber attacks. Both use cyber 
capabilities to attack another state; however, kinetic cyber attacks cause physical 
damage outside of the connected systems, while classic cyber attacks damage the 
cyber system itself. However, for this study, these hybrid and kinetic style strategies 
will not be discussed. 

Problems of Attribution and the Consequences   
	 

	 The problems with attribution, outlined by Finlay and Payne (2017), create a 
significant challenge for counterintelligence services. The attribution problem does not 
change significantly between identifying the culprits of active or passive cyber attacks 
(Berghel, 2017). Determining who carried out an active or passive cyber attack, 
intelligence services pursue three significant avenues of inquiry. First is faith-based 
assumption, through inference and historical analysis. Finlay and Payne highlight this in 
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the case of the 2016 DNC hack, where the US government pronounced Russia's 
culpability. The US Congressional Report provided plenty of circumstantial evidence 
and assumptions but did not offer any irrefutable evidence favouring their conclusions 
(Payne, 2017; Berghel, 2017; US Senate, 2017). Finlay and Payne further explain that 
this is used to maintain political narrative, providing the state with a clear enemy even 
when the evidence is circumstantial.

	 Attribution can be done through network analysis, breaking down the source 
code, and comparison to previous cyber attacks (Payne, 2017). However, cyber attacks 
are consistently changing, making this form of analysis lacking, only preparing the state 
for the attack that already happened. Cyber conflict is similar to the adage of war 
strategy: you're always fighting the previous war rather than the one at hand. There is 
only one reliable method of determining attribution through human intelligence 
(HUMINT) gathering (Berghel, 2017). HUMINT is defined by NATO as "a category of 
intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources 
[instead of technological methods]"(NATO, 2004.) These HUMINT resources creates 
another issue of attribution for HUMINT resources. The revealing evidence that might 
prove the attribution of cyber attacks could expose the state's capabilities to gain 
intelligence on these cyber attacks. In public government announcements on cyber 
attacks, legitimacy can be unreliable. This possible lack of legitimacy leads back to the 
faith-based assumptions through inference (Payne, 2017). With this problem of 
attribution, active and passive cyber attacks become an increasingly attractive tool in 




Problems of Defense  
	 Cyber attacks are nearly continuous and ongoing between states, but there is 
little retaliation against attacks (Carr 2012, Reveron, 2012; Valeriano, 2015). Both 
passive and active cyber attacks attack the pre-existing weaknesses already present 
within the recipient program's code. However, there are cases where external 
resources are required to carry out active cyber attacks on critical "air-gapped" 
systems, but these cases are in the minority. Air-gapped systems are computer 
networks not connected to the internet, creating an "air gap” (Carr, 2012.) For instance, 
the Iran Stuxnet virus is an example, where an individual needed to connect a flash 
drive to the air-gapped nuclear centrifuge system to be able to sabotage its capabilities 
properly (Lindsay, 2013). However, most active and passive cyber attacks are carried 
out entirely through the internet (Carr, 2012). The main issue in states defending 
themselves from such cyber attacks is the offensive advantage of cyber weapons. 
When a cyber-attack happens, the coding of this attack becomes obsolete. The 
defending vulnerabilities are now exposed, and the recipient of the attack has the code 
of the attack to analyze (Denning, 2014; Fischerkeller, 2017). This lack of a shelf life 
incentivizes attackers to change the method attack continuously, looking for new 
vulnerabilities to exploit. Using the Stuxnet virus again as an example: now that the 
attack is executed, it becomes useless since now the Iranian state knows how to 
defend against it and also use it for itself (Carr, 2012). However, it is obsolete since the 
attacking state would likely have protected itself against such an attack. 
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	 Defence against a cyberattack is nearly impossible since the whole function of a 
cyber attack is to exploit existing vulnerabilities (Costigan, 2016). If an institution knows 
about the vulnerability that can be exploited, it will usually take steps to mitigate the 
risk. There is the ability to attempt to defend against an attack in progress; however, it 
is constrained. Defence capabilities are extremely limited to shutting down the system 
in its entirety (often impossible), or closing off infected sections of the network (often 
impractical in a short time-span). Defending is almost impossible to do in real-time 
against an attack, regardless of it being an active or passive cyber attack. The 
unknown vulnerabilities are the cause for concern. Defending against a cyber attack 
would essentially require omniscience or a complete breakdown of a program through 
every line of code. Because even the most basic programs can contain millions of lines 
of code, it becomes impractical to sift through all the data to find one tiny mistake that 
could be overlooked. The work required to create an attacking program is far less than 
the work required to defend a system against all possible eventualities. This imbalance 
creates a significant advantage for offensive operations (Shaji, 2019; Valeriano, 2015; 
Reveron, 2012). Another issue that affects the defence is the pace of technological 
change. Everytime a computer system updates with a new operating system or 
downloads a new program it introduces a new vulnerability. Defence also implies that 
the institution attacked is aware that cyber capabilities are attacking them. Most cyber 
attacks take three months or longer after the initial breach to be detected (Mandiant 
Report, 2014). However, there is a difference between active and passive cyber 
attacks. Active attacks tend to be discovered far sooner due to the drastic 
consequences of a successful attack. In contrast, the whole goal of a passive cyber 
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attack is to remain undiscovered. This gap between attack and discovery allows plenty 
of time for the attackers to infiltrate the systems and steal or sabotage. An example of 
this ignorance of being attacked is in the 2016 Russian hacks of US voter registration 
rolls, which were only announced in 2018 (U.S. Committee of Homeland Security, 
2018.) The one-off nature of cyber attacks does provide a significant disadvantage to 
using cyber attacks in strategy. In spite of this, the problems of discovery and 
attribution often negate this issue. Since states are often not even aware 
cyberweapons attacked them or discover it long after the attack has taken place, cyber 
attacks have accomplished the goals of the offensive state. 

	 Cyber Attacks and Deterrence 
	 Deterrence has been a key concept in all state action, even before the concept 
itself was fully developed and analyzed by the academic community. Deterrence is a 
policy of making their defensive capabilities, or offensive responses to an attack, so 
devastating that the aggressor state would have all benefits of attacking denied 
(Gallagher, 2017). Cyber attacks create an environment of offensive advantage since 
the cost of defending is far higher than attacking. Nuclear deterrence relates closely to 
cyber deterrence due to the similarities to the offensive advantage. However, where 
they differ is the significant damage that either attack could inflict. Nuclear devastation 
and the resultant logic of nuclear deterrence between two armed states create a 
finality, assuming that any massive attack from either side would destroy both states 
(George, 1989; Honkova, 2010). This destruction would result in no net benefits to 
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either attacker, thus creating a fairly stable stalemate. An example is the policy of 
detent carried out by the US and the Soviet Union, nicknamed "MAD," or mutually 
assured destruction (Honkova, 2010). Cyber attack deterrence also differs from the 
interpretation of deterrence in regards to space-based missile defence. The equation of 
deterrence significantly changed by allowing one state to annihilate another without 
destroying itself. Cyber-weapons do not have the capability of societal destruction; 
therefore, punishment does not carry the same weight in strategy compared to nuclear 
strategy. 

	 Lindsay (2015) argues that deterrence by denial works in only the most 
significant cyber attacks since the problems of attribution are less significant. 
Deterrence by denial is a strategy of creating significant defences that would make any 
attack ineffective. It would either mean creating defensive capabilities or making 
systems able to recover quickly from such attacks in the cyber realm. Attribution is 
easier to determine the larger the scale of the attacks. Attribution is also easier if the 
cyber attack is active rather than passive. China can carry out attacks on a larger scale 
than North Korea due to the gap in capabilities. In contrast, Nye (2016) argues 
deterrence by denial only works when facing inconsistent small scale attacks from 
smaller states and non-state actors. When facing significant state opponents such as 
China and Russia, deterrence by entanglement is the most effective strategy (Ryan, 
2018). Deterrence by entanglement is a strategy when both states are so intertwined 
through other means, either economic or cultural, that any attack would significantly 
harm themselves and their opponents (Ryan, 2018). This concept is demonstrated by 
the relationship between the US and China, which are economically linked and cannot 
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take significant harmful action against each other in fear of hurting their domestic 
economies. Both strategies of deterrence have significant flaws since deterrence by 
denial only works in large scale attacks, and deterrence by entanglement only works 
when the two opposing states have tied themselves intrinsically together. 

	 Basic deterrence theory is based on the three key concepts of capability, 
credibility and communication (Johnson, 2015; Vesna, 2002). There is a breakdown in 
how capability, credibility and communication functions with cyber deterrence since 
each concept does not work in regards to cyber attacks. In regards to capability, each 
state has its resources, which they guard all knowledge. It becomes unclear, like in all 
intelligence operations, what are the overall capabilities of a state. One can only 
surmise what the capabilities are through past actions and the estimation of committed 
resources. Past actions is the best indicator of a state’s interpretation of deterrence, 
but still creates an information gap (Johnson, 2015). This information gap leads to the 
next issue of credibility. Without a base knowledge of the capabilities of each state, 
credibility for cyber attacks becomes unclear. Unlike with nuclear deterrence, where 
credibility is easier to determine, for cyber attacks, there is no realistic way to maintain 
the credibility of an attack unless it is ongoing (Carr, 2012.) Deterrence policy requires 
an analysis of credible threats to the state as an indicator. In regards to 
communication, there is no significant issue since states can communicate their 
capabilities and threats like all other conventional warfare. However, there can still be a 
breakdown in communication when a state denies an attack, or a state does not 
discover that it was attacked (Ryan, 2015). In regards to cyber attacks, states 
communicating when they face an attack is a key indicator due the authoritarian norm 
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of maintaining silence. Due to these factors, cyber deterrence itself in isolation is 
practically impossible. Despite these factors, when combined with other more 
conventional arms and state strategy, it does affect deterrence policy since it does 
breakdown these key concepts of capability, credibility and communication. It merely 
adds a new unknown facet as to how a state will apply deterrence in the cyber age. 

	 While cyber capabilities can be included within a state's general deterrence 
policy, maintaining a policy of complete deterrence against other cyber attacks is 
nearly impossible. First, this is impossible due to the interconnected nature of cyber-
space, making isolating a specific attack impossible (Davis, 2015). Secluding a state 
from the global internet, maintaining an internal internet system loses many of the 
internet's inherent benefits. There are some states, most notably China, which can 
isolate its networks through essential cybersecurity functions. However, they cannot 
maintain a complete seal from the global internet due to new tools such as VPN's 
(Virtual private networks), unregistered connections, satellite connection, and other 
workarounds (Fravel, 2018). China's "Great Firewall" does protect the state, but only 
for the access of information from outside of the state not harmful attacks designed to 
mitigate the basic functions of the Great Firewall (Cheng, 2017 p 5). In modern cyber 
deterrence policy, the best action is retribution through their cyber capabilities, 
convention military actions, or international legal actions. In the majority of cases, a 
state will pursue retribution through cyber capabilities. There is a norm of non-
conventional response to cyber attacks (Carr, 2012; Reveron, 2012). However, in the 
face of large devastating attacks on critical infrastructure, many states have an outlined 
policy of convention attack (US Department of Defense, 2016). The US's defence 
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policy most clearly demonstrates this at the end of the Clinton presidency, which 
stated a conventional military response would be used in the event of a devastating 
attack on financial networks, air traffic control networks, or power systems (Clinton 
Whitehouse, 1999). This policy has never been put into practice and remains 
theoretical. 

	 The most common form of cyber deterrence is creating retaliatory cyber attacks 
to distract and deter further cyber attacks. They can either be passive or an active 
retaliatory cyber attack, though the effectiveness is limited (Davis, 2015; Jensen, 2012). 
Another major form of deterrence is using legal consequences to the attacking state. 
These legal actions include state sanctions, legal challenges against individuals from 
the attacking state to restrict their global movement, or prosecuting individuals in their 
respective states (Davis, 2015). Legal actions are not an effective form of deterrence 
due to the continuing onslaught of cyber attacks that a typical state faces daily. It still 
does create a balance of continuous attacks between states, which distracts a state 
from carrying out more damaging cyber attacks. It also creates an ongoing tension 
between states and helps establish a norm of non-conventional response to avoid 
escalation into the conventional military realm. This new form of deterrence creates a 
constant base level of cyber attacks that allows states to engage each other in the 
cyber realm but maintaining a norm of limitation in the scale and damage of cyber 
attacks. Limitation plays into the generalized policy of defence since there is an 
assumption of consistent cyber attacks (Carr, 2012; Valeriano, 2015). At the same time, 
each state attempts to decide how far to push the norms of limitation. Cyber 
capabilities contribute to the overall deterrence policy since it creates an information 
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gap, where a rival state has little knowledge of the information gathered. There is also 
the fear of "sleeper" cyber attacks only activated in worst-case scenarios. These 
attacks are mostly hypothetical, and would only be confirmed in a situation of an all-
out conflict between the two states (Carr, 2012). Pure "cyber" deterrence is nearly an 
impossible concept, but how cyber capabilities play into general state deterrence 
policy is still relevant in how a state mitigates threats from other rival states. 

Economic Incentives for Cyber Attacks 

	 Economics also plays a vital role in determining cyber strategy. If there is 
enough economic incentive, states pursue cyber attacks to gain an economic 
advantage (Inkster, 2015; Schofield, 2016). These activities can range from passive 
based attacks stealing proprietary information from large corporations to engaging in 
an active attack intended to sabotage an economic competitor. The targets of these 
active cyber attacks tend to be private corporations rather than state institutions. 
However, these attacks are still carried out by a state or with state support. There is an 
issue of distinguishing public and private institutions. In Russia and China, state-
sponsored companies have the advantage of government support in their security 
priorities (Fravel, 2018; Austin, 2014). While government management of private entities 
has significant disadvantages compared to free-market enterprise, state companies 
benefit from being central to government legitimacy and access to offensive 
capabilities. These state corporations give the state an increased incentive to maintain 
their competitiveness in the global markets through any means necessary (Cheng, 
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2017). Whether a state attacks primarily private or public institutions is a key indicator 
of economic motivation behind cyber attacks. 

	 Conflict and economics are tightly linked, with multiple theorists analyzing the 
bonds between economic interest, war and strategy. Cyber attacks can provide an 
economic advantage by either stealing information of an adversary or destroying a 
possible market rival's capabilities. However, offensive conflict and economics are not 
as applicable to cyber capabilities due to the norm of non-conventional retaliation. 
When analyzing conflict and economics, there is the base assumption that the state is 
pursuing a full wartime strategy, and its existence is in jeopardy (Clausewitz, 1956). 
With cyber. attacks, there is a constant ongoing conflict between states. However, it 
does not threaten the overall legitimacy or existence of the state itself. Passive cyber 
attacks are prominent for economic purposes since it focusses on the theft of 
economically advantageous information. Active cyber attacks are not as common f 
since it is easier to determine attribution and is far more costly. Brooks’ (2013) analysis 
on economic actors and the prospects of peace state that economic actors are always 
in favour of maintaining peaceful actions since any conflict between states would 
damage the global economy. This theory applies to the use of cyber attacks as a tool 
of conflict since it allows economic actors to maintain the status quo of global peace. 
Since all cyber attacks still follow the norm of non-conventional response, cyber 
attacks are useful for economic actors to gain the advantages of attacking rival states 
while mollifying the possible disadvantages of global conflict and economic disruption. 
A state can attack another state for economic purposes. However, the fundamentals of 
global trade are not cut off by conflict, and the recipient state might not even be aware 
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that an attack occurred. This ignorance allows for an offensive strategy of covert 
economic conflict without risking it spilling into a conventional conflict, which would 
overall harm the majority of the economic actors. 

	 While the priority is on countries, governments are also at risk for economic-
based attacks on their major non-state corporate institutions. These attacks can be 
hacks to their communication networks, reading emails to gain an advantage in 
economic negotiations, or leaking the information to sabotage any negotiated deals. 
An example of this would be the Chinese Night Dragon cyber attacks, which targeted 
the international petroleum industries (CSIS 2020; Cheng, 2017). The attackers sought 
to hack the emails of their executives and market intelligence reports and company 
databases. This attack was a passive based attack discovered in 2008, and no 
systems were modified - this was an attempt to gain information for a purely economic 
benefit. There are very few examples of state-directed active cyber attacks against 
private institutions. Most active attacks against private companies tend to be from non-
state actors. One example of state-directed active attacks against a private institution 
from a state is the North Korean attacks against Sony Pictures, in an attempt to 
dissuade them from releasing "The Interview," a movie that satirizes the North Korean 
regime (BBC, 2014). There is significant difficulty in analyzing cyber attacks against 
private institutions due to the problems of attribution. In the majority of attacks, it can 
never be certain that it was indeed a state which attacked them. Industrial espionage 
and cybercriminals attack private companies at a far higher rate than states (Schofield, 
2016; Mandiant Report 2014; CSIS 2020). There is an incentive to attack private 
companies over public institutions due to the resulting responses to security and 
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liability. Private companies rarely have the complete capabilities to engage in 
continuous cyber campaigns, and in most cases, it would violate the laws of the 
respective state (Goetz, 2008). A state would not want to give that power its private 
companies since it would violate a state’s monopoly on the use of violence and 
enforcement. The liability also becomes an issue since when a private company is 
attacked, it is liable for the stolen information (Inkster, 2015). The company is at fault 
since they could not anticipate the impossible, and the attribution problem makes it 
almost impossible to prosecute the attackers. It also becomes even murkier when 
discussing state companies, since determining if a state-directed its own state-run 
company to engage in industrial espionage for the benefit of the state, or the company 
pursuing its policy to gain an economic advantage. 

	 A states economic policy is another key indicator in economic incentives to 
potential attackers. If a state is highly focused on sectors of the economy vulnerable to 
cyber attacks, then they immediately become a more valuable target merely due to the 
abundance of targets compared to other states (Carr, 2012; Reveron, 2011). These 
vulnerable sectors are high-technology development, internet marketplaces, and online 
databases. If a state is also trying to compete in similar markets, there is a high 
incentive for them to steal information to gain an economic advantage. Due to the 
issues with attribution, and the ability to detect certain cyber attacks, engaging in 
cyber theft through passive attacks can be very appealing. The advantages of 
economic cyber attacks leads to the next indicator, direct net economic benefit from 
cyber attacks. There are incredible upsides to attacking more technologically superior 
states, without many downsides since their guilt can never be completely proven. 
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However, these attackers can face retaliatory cyber attacks to either mitigate the 
information that was stolen or hinder the attackers' ability to carry out further cyber 
campaigns. There are multiple cases where a state has engaged in economically 
beneficial cyber attacks against other states, mostly in the theft of proprietary 
information (Jackson, 2014). Lindsay (2013) distinguishes that gathering information 
and converting it into economically advantageous information is significantly different. 
China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and Ukraine have all engaged in cyber attacks for 
economic benefits rather than merely state security, but do they have the ability to use 
it. It is similar to Soviet espionage regarding nuclear weapons. Stalin's spies managed 
to steal the information on how to construct a nuclear weapon but still lacked the 
engineering capabilities to act on the information (Schwartz, 1996). While this is a 
significant problem for both China and Russia, it does not dissuade them from 
attacking rival companies. Companies in the US are losing up to 4 billion dollars a year 
to cyber attacks carried out by both states and third-party actors (Jackson, 2014). 
These attacks both disrupt the economic functions of a company and decrease the 
confidence of possible investors into the private entity. 

The Motivation of Cyber Attacks based on Relative State Power 

	 International relative power also plays a role in how the state determines its 
cyber strategy. Countries that perceive themselves to be under more significant threats 
tend to pursue a more aggressive cyber policy since cyber attacks are an efficient way 
fight asymmetrically (Carr, 2012; Saltzman, 2013). State isolation is a key indicator of 
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international relative power, since an isolated state does not have the same abundance 
of resources. When facing an asymmetrical conflict, it becomes far more valuable to 
engage in cyber campaigns than risk using conventional military action (Breen, 2011). 
Smaller states can have significant cyber impact compared to their conventional 
military power. Using North Korea is a prime example; it is a fragile state with a military 
slowly rusting away with outdated weaponry and training. In cyberspace, a minimal 
investment can produce substantial results. North Korea's list of cyber attacks dwarfs 
even major western states like Germany or the UK (CSIS, 2020). The problem of 
attribution also benefits states facing more asymmetrical conflict since they can attack 
without much threat of retribution from a powerful offended state. The size of the state 
also benefits in securitizing its cyberspace when facing retaliation. A smaller state 
means a smaller network, resulting in fewer vulnerabilities and access points 
(Saltzman, 2013). Cyber attacks are becoming the tool of choice for countries with 
fewer resources. While passive cyber attacks are advantageous due to the small 
amount of resources required, active cyber attacks are useful tools for asymmetric 
conflict. Passive cyber attacks allow small states to target larger opponents without the 
threat of conventional retribution. Ebert and Maurer (2013) argue that cyber-space is 
one of the only areas where rising powers such as the infamous BRICS (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China, and South Africa) states can effectively challenge US hegemony. In their 
negotiations with the US concerning international law and security treaties. China and 
Russia advocate for more closed systems to protect themselves from cyber threats 
and information that could weaken their domestic political control.
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	 In international relations, there is the conventional concept that a "revisionist 
power" would be more apt to violate international norms or rules to increase their 
power at the expense of their dominant adversaries. This concept is argued by 
Mearsheimer (2014), who claims that China is a revisionist power, and that conflict 
between status quo powers and revisionist powers is inevitable. A revisionist power 
would have the incentive to pursue a strategy that reshapes the international system 
and hasten the decline of the status quo power. In this case, these revisionist powers 
would be more likely to use active attacks to weaken the international system's 
hegemon. This theory is not airtight since China actively avoids international conflict, 
and maintains a net benefit in the current international system. Jones and Hart (2011) 
answer this problem by stating that rising powers are happy to allow the current 
reigning hegemon to maintain the costs and burdens of international leadership. In 
contrast, revisionist powers maintain focus on their growth and domestic politics. In 
this case, revisionist states would use passive cyber attacks to gain information and 
focus on internal growth. As the leading power, the US does not have the same ability 
to pick conflicts to involve itself, both military and non-military. They must engage all 
across the world to maintain their international order while a rising, or resurgent power 
like China and Russia can take a back-seat to global leadership while maintaining the 
benefits of the international system (Ebert, 2013). By pursuing a strategy of selective 
engagement rising powers prefer to maintain dominance within their regional spheres 
to maintain security without extending themselves past their capabilities. In this 
system, they can also challenge US leadership in specific areas, with more focus, and 
without the distractions of international leadership. Russia is a clear case with its policy 
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focused on maintaining its security in its regional sphere, confronting any 
encroachment by western powers (Lunde, 2014). This idea can be challenged, since 
China has recently taken on more responsibility for the international order, and is trying 
to reshape a global economic system for its benefit. The "Belt and Road" initiative 
helping connect China securely to global markets in the Global South is a clear 
example (Fravel, 2018). This economic integration within the global economic is 
another indicator of international relative power. With this increase in leadership, China 
is quickly becoming a second global hegemon. 

	 With these possible explanations to a state's actions within the international 
order, it clarifies how this affects cyber strategies. With the problems of attribution and 
detection, cyber operations allow rising or resurgent powers to challenge the global 
hegemon without significant risk to themselves, in specific conflicts of their choosing. 
One significant indicator of challenges to the international order is that of territorial 
disputes. When a state claims another's territory, there is a problem in the international 
system to the claimant state. With these claims, the stagnation of these claims' 
resolution means that a state will have to act outside of the traditional international 
order to regain territory (Ebert, 2013). Acting outside of international norms can be 
achieved through multiple policy areas. However, the one with the least outward 
consequences to the claimant state is the use of their cyber capabilities. Active cyber 
attacks would signal that a state is pursuing strategies that break international norms, 
while passive cyber attacks would be in line with maintaining the international norms. 
This difference in strategy is demonstrated with the information campaigns China 
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pursues in Taiwan to increase the popularity of reunification and Russia's attacks on 
Georgian and Ukrainian infrastructure during the 2008 and 2014 conflicts (Renz, 2016). 

Institutional Organization and Cyber Strategy  
	 Another key factor highlighted by scholars is how the respective state organizes 
institutions that carry out their cyber-security policies. When determining cyber-attack 
strategies, these attacks are carried out by a state's cyber-security institutions. Most 
governments create specific departments to manage the cyber-security of their 
respective states. However, specific indicators of institutional organization provide a 
more in-depth analysis of how these resources are used and the potential pools of 
resources. An indicator of institutional organization is how funds are allocated to 
individual departments. States which spend lavishly on specific cyber capabilities 
would be more likely to pursue more costly active cyber attacks. In contrast, a state 
which spends less on specific cyber capabilities could only carry out low-resource 
passive attacks. States have the incentive to misrepresent their capabilities by either 
over or under-reporting their spent resources to either convince their rivals that they are 
either not a legitimate threat or that they are too threatening to challenge directly. 
Determining if a state is over or under-representing their figures is incredibly difficult 
without a specific analysis of the dependent military-industrial complex. Even then, 
these figures remain tightly held secrets. To Chen (2009) and Oxenstierna (2016), it is 
the standard norm for larger states to under-represent their allocated defensive 
spending to convince the hegemon that they are not as threatening to their interests. 
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This norm of under-reporting is consistent, and both China and Russia under-report 
their military spending to hide their true capabilities in the face of possible conflict. 
These figures can also be represented through public spending in other possible policy 
areas, with domestic security spending contributing to external defence capabilities. 
Often this type of spending does double duty in both increasing internal and external 
security. China spends lavishly on its internal monitoring capabilities that can also be 
used for international monitoring and cyber attacks. This norm is especially present in 
authoritarian governments since defensive spending has the double capabilities of 
maintaining domestic and international control of their respective interests (Chen, 
2009). 

	 The structure and division of these institutions regarding cyber capabilities is 
essential. Without the same delineation as western governments, the institutions of 
cyber capabilities in other states can be far more muddled or folded into other 
institutions with their specific priorities. Authoritarian states can often use defensive 
capabilities to maintain domestic as well as international security. Russia is a clear 
demonstration of this concept with its use of the FSB, the successor organization to 
the KGB (Lunde, 2014). These institutions also do not have the same limitations as 
their western counterparts, which have mandates and legal restraints to maintain 
individual freedoms and freedom of information. If a state has a specific department 
dedicated to its own goals and mandate, their use of the allocated resources is far 
more efficient. It guarantees the funds are directed to specific cyber-security goals. 
Having specific delineation between departments would allow for states to organize 
and carry out more sophisticated active cyber attacks. While in the case of a more 
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muddled administrative organization, the priority of cyber strategy can be overruled by 
other state priorities, allowing neglect and fewer resources directed to cyber specific 
capabilities. This situation would encourage the primary use of less resource-intensive 
passive cyber attacks. There is also the issue of non-state actors acting on behalf of 
the state, being paid through unrecorded back-channels. These "grey" hat hackers 
often act in concert with the state's specific goals, sometimes directed by the state or 
acting on their initiative. Klimburg (2011) argues that these cyber "grey hats" function 
similarly to the former paramilitary units of communist regimes, which have their 
autonomy but still need some form of control exercised in the case of disagreement 
with the state. A state directs cyber attacks without identifying themselves to the 
hacking unit, which operates independently for their own ideological or financial 
reasons. Their interests might align with the state, but they do not hold any loyalty to 
the state's goal. These "grey hats" are only loyal to their specific interests.  

	 Lunde (2014) argues that the lack of human capital creates a significant problem 
for the institutional organization for cyber conflict. Without a large pool of trained 
individuals in such an advanced skills-set or providing programs to increase the state's 
ability to create human capital, the institutions will struggle to increase their cyber 
capacity. Fravel (2018) contributes to the importance of human capital by emphasizing 
China's ability to create specific educational programs to train individuals in the skillset 
required to pursue cyber capabilities. In respect to the United States, they maintain the 
best educational system in the world with specific programs created to funnel capable 
individuals directly into state institutions involved in cyber conflict. This human capital 
also extends into the non-state cyber actors, with access being a key component. 
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Having access to a ready supply of well-trained human capital will allow a state to 
engage in more complex active cyber attacks. In contrast, a lack of human capital will 
limit a state to less sophisticated passive cyber attacks. Klimburg (2011) argues that if 
a state has access to these non-state cyber actors, they can achieve similar goals to 
maintain their large base of human capital, but they are not nearly as reliable. These 
third-party actors can mitigate the lack of training and help states with low human 
capital carry out sophisticated, active cyber attacks. Having access to domestic 
human capital with the training to aid in a state's cyber strategy can be carried out far 
more effectively and with peace of mind. Many smaller states use the human capital of 
other nations to boost their cyber capabilities, such as Brazil and Turkey (Ebert, 2013). 
This inclusion of foreign actors into their clandestine cyber operations creates 
significant risk since they can report back to their own home countries. However, this 
risk is seen as necessary to develop their nascent programs to expand the base of 
their human capital by allowing their foreign actors to train their state in the same 
skillset. 

	 This literature review outlines that there are several key factors in determining 
how cyber strategy is determined. It highlights several possible indicators to test if they 
are, in fact, significant influences on strategy. However, due to the clandestine nature of 
cyber operations, other possible factors remain unclear due to the lack of 
documentation. While several key academics provide an exceptional understanding of 
the factors around cyber capabilities and have access to classified material, they are 
still subjected to their personal bias and the bias of the institutions. It cannot be clear if 
these academics are receiving all the possible facts and data to create an informed 
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decision, or have limited access to sources that merely confirm their suspicions and 
allow the analyzed state to present an advantageous perspective. A new possible 
explanation of how a state determines a cyber strategy can be unearthed by providing 






	 The world of cyber capabilities is muddled with multiple conflicting accounts of 
strengths, weaknesses and active campaigns. In this paper the question, "Is there a 
specific factor which encourages Russia to pursue active cyber attacks and China to 
pursue passive cyber attacks ?” will be answered using document and policy analysis. 
A case study analysis of Russia and China will be done to see if there is a persuasive 
answer. While policy analysis has its weaknesses, this study will provide an accurate 
picture of these two country's cyber capabilities. This analysis will only include publicly 
available information due to the limitation of classified information. Using multiple 
sources from private institutions, government documents from both NATO member 
states, and Russia and China, respectively, an accurate picture is developed and can 
be pursued further when access to more guarded information becomes available. 

Policy Sources 
	 The documents used as evidence for this paper come from multiple sources, 
government and private institutions, from NGOs, secondary sources, and personal 
accounts of key actors within the cyber-security and conventional security realm. The 
first set of documents is from NGOs and the private institutions, which catalogue all 
known cyber attacks against NATO members and the suspected perpetrators and the 
specific institutions attacked in the private and public sectors. The second set of 
documents pursued are from western NATO governments, providing public records 
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detailing their cyber capabilities and their perceived and realized threats. The third set 
of documents are government documents provided by Russia and China, some 
translated by their respective governments, and others translated by other academics 
or western governments. Also included is an analysis of secondary documents 
provided by established experts in cyber-security and specialists on Russia and China. 
Finally, the last set of analyzed reports are first-hand accounts and the established 
doctrines from several key members of China and Russia's security policy before and 
after the advent of cyber strategy as a significant factor in state security. The main 
advantage of using document analysis is the availability of information provided and 
the ease of access to public documents. In pursuing research into such a clandestine 
activity, few other methods can be used when not having full access to classified data 
concerning a state's cyber activity. Comparing multiple documents from both the 
attacking, defending and observing actors will create an accurate picture of the 
motivations.

Problems and Mitigation  
	 There are distinct disadvantages to policy analysis that must be addressed and 
mitigated—the first being access to classified documents. Many documents which 
could provide more precise detail in this analysis are classified. While this study does 
not have access to these documents, the use of multiple public documents can 
mitigate this issue regarding the most recent attacks and capabilities. Maintaining state 
secrecy about these capabilities often does not remain secret for long, and NGOs and 
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other private institutions provide enough analysis to infer conclusions that remain state 
secrets. Another issue is biased selectivity, where the selection of the documents is 
subject to personal bias. This bias is mitigated by using multiple sources to provide 
legitimacy to the provided evidence. Another method of reducing selective bias will be 
using sources attempting to disprove the initial conclusions of the research in a 
thorough attempt to maintain a rigorous analysis. Finally, the last major issue of this 
study is dealing with government documents from Russia and China that might not 
provide an accurate depiction of their capabilities. Since both states are authoritarian 
and do not guarantee freedom of information, the public-facing information can often 
be misleading or inaccurate. These documents are prone to either over-exaggeration or 
complete denial of offensive attacks, even in response to recorded attacks by the 
defending institutions. This inaccuracy can be mitigated by pairing them with sources 
from NGOs and other government institutions to ensure accuracy. 

First Factor: Economic Incentives  
	 When analyzing economic incentive, many potential indicators can explain 
whether these attacks are carried out for primary economic rather than a political 
benefit. The first significant indicator chosen is that of the directly attacked institutions, 
are they primarily private businesses, or are they attacking specific government 
institutions? If it is primarily businesses, what type of businesses are they attacking 
and what information was stolen or destroyed. Which government institutions are 
attacked? Are the attacks focused on the state's defensive capabilities, or are they 
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focused on their domestic economic institutions? Initial conclusions state that if the 
cyber attack targets are primarily commercial, a state will use passive cyber attacks as 
their dominant strategy (Cashell, 2004; Goetz, 2008). However, some active cyber 
attacks on defensive capabilities can be for economic benefits. In contrast, attacks on 
domestic economic institutions can be motivated to disrupt the state's functions. 
Analyzing the context of these attacks and information from both NGOs and 
government documents will clarify motivating factors. 

	 Another possible indicator of the economic incentive behind the attacks is the 
economic focus of the attacking states. Are the states primarily focused on developing 
their technology-based economy, or are they focused on resource extraction? Is the 
state itself attempting to diversify its economy beyond its current focuses for a 
competitive advantage? If a state is attempting to expand its technology focused 
economy, passive cyber attacks are favoured over active attacks. If a state's economy 
is focused on resource extraction, they would have less incentive to use passive cyber 
attacks to gain economically advantageous information. They are also more 
encouraged to pursue active cyber attacks since their economy is not as vulnerable to 
cyber attacks when facing possible retaliation. 

	 Finally, the last indicator is if the likelihood of cyber attacks provides a direct 
economic net benefit to the attacking state. This link can be either intellectual patents 
being stolen and put on the market early, or the theft of personal private data. Passive 
attacks are more likely to provide economic benefit to the attacking state, while active 
attacks are more likely to cause economic harm to the attacking state. Passive attacks 
are less likely to be discovered and cause international consequences and the reverse 
43
when engaging in active cyber attacks. China and Russia have a blurry separation 
between state and private enterprise, due to their reliance on large state-run 
businesses such as Gazprom (Russia) and Sinopec (China) (Lunde, 2014; Fravel 2018). 
Therefore state cyber attacks can benefit specific companies rather than the state as a 
whole. By analyzing if there is a net benefit after cyber attacks, the motivation behind 
them can help determine the cyber strategy pursued. Table one (below) helps explain 
how the indicators would theoretically determine the effect economic factors have on 
the difference between active and passive cyber strategy. 

Table 1. Theoretical Application of Economic Factors on Cyber Strategy 
Second Factor: Relative International Power 

Theoretical Application 
of Economic Factors on 
Cyber Strategy











	 Relative international power provides another possible explanation for the 
difference in cyber strategy. One of the indicators for the international position is the 
isolation of the attacking state by the international community, either through sanctions 
or public denouncements. A state's isolation from the international community will 
encourage it to pursue strategies that are more disruptive to the international 
community since they hold little share in the benefits of these institutions (Mearsheimer, 
2014). Being isolated also encourages the state to become a more revisionist power, 
looking to change the rules of international conflict to better their goals rather than 
maintain the liberal rules-based order established after WW2. This isolation would 
imply that the state would be more agreeable with using active cyber attacks in regards 
to state strategy. An isolated state would be more likely to pursue active cyber attacks 
over passive cyber attacks since the international community could not punish the 
offending state effectively. 

	 Another indicator concerning the attacking state's international position is the 
reliance on international trade. If the state relies on international trade with other states, 
the appearance of being low risk to information theft or sabotage is key to maintaining 
these economic benefits. If a state appears to be a more risky endeavour for 
investment, there is a higher likelihood that a state will pursue an active cyber attack 
since it would not lose much economic benefit (Goetz, 2008). If a state is heavily reliant 
on international investment, it will pursue passive cyber attacks since the risk of 
discovery and attribution is far less. These actions tie back to the definitions of strategy 
in using any tools to achieve state goals. If state goals are heavily reliant on trade, they 
will not pursue a strategy that puts that aspect of their economy in danger.  
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	 The last indicator is the response to ongoing territorial disputes with 
neighbouring states. A territorial dispute is one of the most explicit indications that the 
respective state is not fully accepting of the international order and is possibly willing to 
break certain norms to achieve their territorial goals. However, there is a difference in 
analysis when looking at territorial disputes, including conventional military action, and 
those without conventional military action. The differences demonstrate which state is 
adhering best to the international regime since conventional warfare to gain territory is 
illegal under international law (UN, 1945). By analyzing their past actions in pursuing 
state goals of expansion, we can interpret which state would use a more aggressive 
strategy to pursue these territorial disputes. If a state is actively breaking international 
norms to solve territorial disputes, they are more likely to pursue active cyber attacks. 
They are already breaking international norms such as using conventional force; 
therefore, the international community's ability to punish them is reduced. If a state is 
not breaking international norms, they are more likely to use passive attacks, since it 
does not overtly violate the International norms they are upholding. Table two (below) 
illustrates what the theoretical explanation would say in determining the difference in 
pursues active or passive cyber attacks. 

Table 2. Theory of International Power and its Impacts on Cyber Strategy  
Theory of International 
Power and its Impacts on 
Cyber Strategy 
Active Cyber Attack Passive Cyber Attack 




Third Factor: Institutional Organization  
	 Another possible factor in explaining the differences in using passive versus 
active cyber attacks is how officially committed resources are used and divided 
between the cyber organizations of the respective state. The amount of resources a 
state has, influences the strategies they use to pursue state goals, and also shows the 
priorities of the respective state. This analysis does create a problem of endogeny; 
however, the availability of funds has a significant influence on cyber capabilities 
potential strategies. One indicator is the publicly presented budget of cyber-security 
presented by each state and where it is allocated. While the budgets are not always 
accurate, they will also be compared with NGO and NATO estimates. While it becomes 
speculative determining which is the most accurate number, it does provide a window 
of allocated costs that will be compared between states. This analysis will include 
military spending and civilian spending on cyber-security to provide a more accurate 








Theory of International 
Power and its Impacts on 
Cyber Strategy 
Active Cyber Attack Passive Cyber Attack 
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picture of the allocated resources. The underlying assumption is that a state with less 
committed resources would not be able to carry out large-scale cyber attacks, 
especially active cyber attacks, which in theory is more resource intensive. 

	 The next indicator for institutional organization will be the governmental 
structure determined to manage their cybersecurity capabilities. Is their cybersecurity 
division a singular entity? Alternatively, is it merged with other government functions 
such as intelligence or military? When these cyber-security teams are merged under 
other institutions, they tend not to have as many resources or a direct mandate for their 
operations. The division of tasks also determines if there are any specific restrictions or 
mandates placed on these institutions. The division of tasks shows how a state 
prioritizes its resources and where the emphasis is placed upon pursuing state 
strategy. This analysis becomes complicated with Russia and China's specific cases 
since the division between civilian and military institutions can often be blurred, as well 
as the separation between private entities and government (Lunde, 2014; Fravel 2018). 
With a more defined separation of government entities, a state would have a higher 
capacity to carry out cyber attacks due to the direct focus of government priorities on 
using these tools in the overall state strategy. If a state has separation between their 
government entities, the theory is that they would be more capable of carrying out 
active cyber attacks. A state with less organizational distinction would only have the 
capabilities to carry out less intensive passive cyber attacks. 

	 The last indicator analyzed for institutional focus is the availability of human 
capital to carry out cyber attacks. To determine human capital requires an analysis of 
their technology sector, and the specific use of government resources to carry out 
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cyber attacks. In certain specific attacks, third parties are contracted out to carry out 
cyber attacks on behalf of the state (Carr, 2012; Lunde, 2014). Sometimes these 
attacks are carried out by these third-party actors (grey hats) without even having 
confirmation that they are acting on behalf of a specific state (Klimburg, 2011). It will 
also require an analysis of educational programs and the availability of access to these 
programs to train individuals in the skill set required to carry out such attacks. Training 
individuals to engage in such attacks required a significant investment on behalf of the 
state to gain enough human capital to enact large scale cyber attacks (Valeriano, 2015). 
The initial thoughts on how human capital affects cyber capabilities are that with a 
smaller number of trained individuals, a state cannot carry out large active cyber 
attacks. State strategy requires a state to use the resources and tools it has and must 
plan around the limitations presented. In theory, a state with less access to human 
capital would be limited to carrying out passive cyber attacks. However, there is a 
counter-intuitive argument that could incentivize states to use third party actors, which 
are much more likely to carry out more disruptive active attacks in their strategy 
(Valeriano, 2015). Table 3 explains how the theory would expect a state to pursue cyber 
strategy in relation to institutional focus. 

Table 3. Theory of Institutional Organization and the Impacts on Cyber Strategy  
Theory of Institutional 
Organization and the Impacts 
on Cyber Strategy 






Fourth Factor: Interpretation of Deterrence 

	 The last factor in determining whether a state primarily carries out an active or 
passive cyber attack is the state's application to and concept of deterrence policy. 
Cyber deterrence in isolation is an impossible task; however, cyber capabilities still 
affect how a state pursues a general deterrence policy. Cyber capabilities add new 
challenges to the underlying deterrence factors of capability, credibility and 
communication (Fischkeller, 2017; Libicki, 2009; Johnson, 2015; Danilovic, 2002). A 
state engages in cyber deterrence by providing a continuous low level of cyber attacks 
to distract the defending state by occupying it while demonstrating the attacking 
state's capabilities working in concert with a state's conventional forms of deterrence. 
The first indicator of deterrence is how the state has historically applied deterrence 
concepts to previous problems of state security. If the state has historically pursued 
deterrence by using information as its advantage, they would be more likely to pursue 
passive cyber attacks. If a state uses deterrence through overwhelming force, it is more 
Specific institutions for cyber 
security 
X
Merged into other government 
institutions 
X
Availability of Human Capital 
High Availability X
Low Availability X
Theory of Institutional 
Organization and the Impacts 
on Cyber Strategy 
Active Cyber Attack Passive Cyber Attack 
50
likely to pursue active cyber attacks. Historical deterrence is defined by the state's 
previous policies when confronting a security problem. Historical deterrence policy 
requires a detailed analysis of previous military and intelligence commanders and their 
previous interpretations. 

	 The next indicator of the state's deterrence policy is the credibility of the 
perceived threat posed to the state. Each state has a unique hierarchy of threats to the 
existence of the regime and enacts a policy of deterrence as apart of state strategy to 
mitigate the risks. Both China and Russia require an analysis of the specific deterrence 
policies and how their cyber strategies are included within their defensive posture. 
There is also an analysis of specific threats within the cyber realm and how it differs 
from conventional military threat and how these two threats act in unison. If a state 
perceived a high level of a credible threat, it would more likely engage in active cyber 
attacks. If a state perceives a low level of credible threats, it would be more likely to 
invest in passive cyber attacks. This analysis will look through these states current 
perceived credible threats and determine if there is a significant different in posture 
between states. 

	 Finally, the last indicator of differing concepts of deterrence affecting the primary 
method of cyber attacks is communication, represented by how many cyber attacks 
the state acknowledged. In authoritarian states, acknowledging cyber attacks is a risky 
endeavour since it can undercut the public perception of citizens to the effectiveness of 
the state's security. Since authoritarian regimes primarily rely on the concept of 
protecting their citizens, and acknowledgement of failure undercuts a primary reason 
why the state does not allow typical individual freedoms protected in most 
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democracies. Suppose the state admits it receives cyber attacks and accuses a state. 
In that case, it shows a break in the norms of communication found in most 
authoritarian regimes and demonstrates that the regime perceives itself secure enough 
to admit weakness. These occasions are incredibly rare, but they also provide a 
window into the defensive nature of their cyber-security apparatus, and how much their 
adversaries are attacking them. Finding a record of cyber attacks by western states on 
Russia and China is incredibly difficult, with such information being highly protected. If 
a state admits to receiving attacks by the US, it can be assumed that these 
accusations are legitimate since the usual norm is to conceal and publicly ignore. If an 
authoritarian state admits they face cyber attacks, they are more likely to pursue 
passive cyber attacks as a response. The state perceives itself to be secure and does 
not need to pursue destructive active cyber attacks to deter rival states. If a state does 
not admit they receive cyber attacks, they are more likely to use active cyber attacks. 
The threat to the state is significant and it must use active cyber attacks as a 
deterrence to stop rival states from exploiting possible weakness. Table 4 helps explain 
how each state should choose between active and passive cyber attacks concerning 
its interpretation of deterrence. If deterrence is the significant factor in determining 
cyber strategy, the following indicators will relate in this way between active and 
passive cyber attacks. 

Table 4. Theory of Deterrence Interpretation and the Impacts on Cyber Strategy  
Theory of Deterrence 
Interpretation and the Impacts 
on Cyber Strategy 
Passive Cyber Attacks Active Cyber Attacks
Historical Deterrence 
interpretation is based on? 
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	 This methodology will provide an accurate picture of the significant factors 
influencing the prevalence of a specific cyber-attack strategy. These four factors: 
economic incentive, international position, institutional organization and interpretation 











Theory of Deterrence 
Interpretation and the Impacts 
on Cyber Strategy 
Passive Cyber Attacks Active Cyber Attacks
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Discussion and Results: 
	 The findings of this policy analysis have unearthed several compelling 
explanations for why states might pursue active or passive cyber attacks. However, the 
most compelling arguments that determine if a state primarily pursues active or passive 
cyber attacks are its historical application and interpretation of deterrence policy. Each 
state interprets the concept differently according to its political structure, history and 
the prominent policy leaders in each state. This research does not discount the 
possibility that economic factors, international hierarchy, or institutional organization 
are contributing factors. However, historical deterrence interpretation primarily explains 
how a state enacts its cyber strategy. To explain how these four factors affect the 
policy outcomes, I will explore each contributing factor and the preliminary conclusions 
I have reached on the effects these factors have on each state's cybersecurity policy. 
These partial explanations also contribute to the understanding of the policy decisions. 
Deterrence, however, is the only one that adequately explains both why Russia pursues 
active attacks, while China favours passive attacks. 

Economic Incentives  
	 The first factor, economic incentives, initially is one of the primary drivers 
explaining why a state would pursue passive cyber attacks against other states. There 
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is a clear cut benefit for engaging in passive attacks due to its ability to go unnoticed 
and, at the same time, stealing information that can provide a market advantage to the 
attacking state. If Russia and China follow the theoretical model outlined in Table 1, the 





	 China's cyber-attack targets have been relatively equal between private and 
public institutions, but they often combine attacks in tandem. In an analysis of Centre 
for Strategic and International Studies' (CSIS) significant cyber attacks between 
2006-2020, there is an even distribution between attacks on private institutions and 
public institutions, often in tandem (CSIS, 2020). The US-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission states that:

 "The Chinese government is directing and executing a large-scale cyber espionage 
campaign against the United States and to date has successfully targeted the networks 
of U.S. government and private organizations, including those of DoD and private 
firms." (US China Economic and Security Commission, p259, 2013)

There are attacks on the pharmaceutical industry and the U.S. health department in 
2020 and attacks on Mitsubishi engineering and the U.S. defence department to gain 
proprietary information on military contracts and patents (CSIS, 2020). These are 
primarily passive attacks and do not affect the systems in which the information is 
stolen. These attacks are advantageous since it often takes months to years to 
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discover, and a culprit identified (Valeriano, 2017). In many cases outlined in CSIS' data 
set of significant cyber incidents since 2006, many attacks are inferred from China but 
with no irrefutable proof. However, due to their strategic attacks on both public and 
private institutions simultaneously in similar fields, the conclusion is that China is the 
only state with the resources and motivation to carry out such large-scale attacks.

	 Russia, on the other hand, carries out a different style of attack. The majority of 
Russian attacks are carried out against public institutions, referring to the list of 
significant cyber incidents provided by CSIS(2020). These attacks are both passive and 
active. Their passive attacks are for information gathering, but the focus is more on the 
governing representative institutions than the regulatory agencies or related 
departments. (Austin, 2014; Fravel, 2018; CSIS, 2020). Their attacks are also multi-
staged attacks using passive cyber attacks to gain the information, then use the 
gathered information for active cyber attacks and information warfare, by distributing 
propaganda and undermining governing institutions (Lunde, 2014). An example of this 
is highlighted by the U.S. Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection 
and Security Technologies of the Committee on Homeland Security: 

"In 2009, … cyber-spies from Russia … had penetrated the U.S. electrical grid, leaving 
behind software programs. The intruders did not cause damage to U.S. infrastructure, 
but sought to navigate the systems and their controls". (USHS, 2013)

	 When Russia attacks private institutions, they tend to be institutions that are 
critical for state functions such as power grids or internet access (CSIS, 2020). In 2008, 
during the Brown Soldier protests, Russia attacked Estonia, engaged in Denial of 
Service attacks, which caused internet access to and from Estonia to be severely 
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restricted (Lunde, 2014). In 2014, coordinating in hybrid conflict, Russia attacked 
several power stations in Ukraine and managed to sabotage the electric grid severely 
hampering the state's ability to coordinate against incoming Russia sponsored 
conventional military attacks (Kshetri, 2017; ICS, 2016). These attacks demonstrate 
that while they engage in passive cyber attacks, Russia favours active attacks far more 
prominently than other comparable states. 

Economic Focus of China and Russia  
	 The next indicator of economic incentives is the primary economic focus of each 
of the respective states. Overall, China is aggressively pursuing a technology-focused 
economy to gradually transfer away from its manufacturing-based economy pursued 
for the past 30 years (Austin, 2014; Fravel, 2017). The seeds of this high-tech focus on 
the economy go back to the opening of China under Deng Xiaoping and the 
establishment of special economic zones (Austin, 2014). These zones allowed for 
international investment and private businesses without the traditional restriction of a 
command economy. The first being the Shenzen high-tech economic zone, with a 
particular focus on attracting outside economic investment to boost their nascent 
technology sector (Austin, 2014). In 2006, China enacted its "National Strategy for 
Informationization Development 2006-2020," which focused on: 

◦ promoting the information technology sector,  
◦ increase the accessibility of computers and computer networks, 
◦ expand digital network technologies  
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◦ and expanding their national information infrastructure (Fravel, p202, 
2017).  
	 These key policy goals demonstrate that China's economic focus is the 
technological innovation of its domestic economy. This focus is partially due to their 
attempt to transition away from their manufacturing focus, which is becoming less 
competitive in the international market due to increased labour costs compared to 
other developing nations (Fravel, 2017; Cheng 2018). In enacting new policy goals, 
China's cyber attacks strategy works in tandem to increase competitiveness in the 
international market. Attacking key industry leaders such as Google in 2010 and 2011 
under the name "operation Aurora" and against South Korean, Japanese and 
Taiwanese technology companies in 2011 labelled "Icefog" (CSIS, 2020; Cheng, 2018). 
These are only a few of the recorded and discovered attacks carried out by China. 
However, there are possibly far more operations that have not been detected due to 
the difficulty in identifying passive based cyber attacks. 

	 Russia has a similar attempt at pursuing a competitive high tech sector following 
China's model (Lunde, 2014). Primarily their economy is based on natural resource 
extraction and export (Worldbank, 2019). During the Soviet era, the government 
distrusted new computer technology in fear that it would help precipitate the loss of 
political control the party maintained (Lunde, 2014). After the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the incentives to maintain a lucrative resource extraction economy remained 
with a heavy focus on oil and gas production and mineral extraction. This focus away 
from high-technology towards resource extraction did not provide the same incentive 
structure for Russia to engage in attacks on private institutions since their benefits for 
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technological gain are not as prevalent in the resource extraction sector. Russia has 
been inching towards export diversification; however, it has been slow without much 
progress (Worldbank, 2019; Kremlin, 2019). Russia is attempting to create high 
technology centres in the model of China's Special Economic Zones (SEZ). The 
Government of Russia states in an investment presentation on SEZ's that: 

"A number of established Special Economic Zones in Russia has considerably 
increased since the Federal Law No. 116-FZ of July 22, 2005 "On the Special 
Economic Zones in the Russian Federation" passed. The law was aimed at attracting 
both foreign and national investment to boost economic development in manufacturing 
industries and infrastructure." (Government of Russia, 2017)

	 They have fallen short of their initial goals and have not been pursued as 
doggedly as its resource extraction policy (Hanson, 2019). They are also facing an 
increasingly volatile commodity market and a shift away from fossil fuels, which 
provides them less of a budget to help invest in these nascent industries and 
encourages attempts to diversify the economy (Hanson, 2019; Worldbank, 2019). This 
lack of a high tech industry creates a shortcoming in state function to carry out multiple 
long term cyber campaigns, requiring reliance on third-party actors (Austin, 2014; 
Liblicki, 2009). These third-party actors are less likely to engage cyber attacks for 
economic purposes since passive economic attacks require a level of knowledge to 
determine the most advantageous information. 

Direct Economic Benefit 
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	 The final indicator of economic factors is determining if there was a direct 
economic benefit for the attacking state when engaging in cyber attacks. In China's 
case, there is a clear net economic benefit demonstrated with the technology they are 
putting on the market to compete with western tech giants. There have been legal 
cases brought against China in the theft of information technology such as 
smartphones and operating systems (Roper, 2013; Dept of Justice, 2018). In 10 years, 
China has managed to compete internationally with its own Huawei smartphones, 
which draw heavily from American companies' established patents (Cheng, 2019; 
USCC, 2010; Dept of Justice, 2018). However, in the case of Chinese hacking, western 
countries are often hesitant to report their security breaches. It can reduce confidence 
in business security and risk access to the Chinese markets, which remain profitable 
even with the risks of passive cyber attacks stealing proprietary information (NPR, 
2019). One specific example is the July 21st indictment of two Chinese hackers 
attacking U.S. businesses. The U.S. Justice Department states:

 "The cybercrime hacking occurring here was first discovered on computers of the 
Department of Energy's Hanford Site in Eastern Washington. As the grand jury charged, 
the computer systems of many businesses, individuals and agencies throughout the 
United States and worldwide have been hacked and compromised with a huge array of 
sensitive and valuable trade secrets, technologies, data, and personal information being 
stolen (U.S. Department of Justice, 2020). 

	 While determining direct economic benefit is difficult, the costs put on western 
companies can result in, on average, 225 billion - 600 billion dollars lost per year (IP 
Commission Report, 2017). However, there is a limitation to the effectiveness of cyber 
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attacks for economic benefit. There is a significant limitation on the effectiveness of 
information and patent theft due to the inherent problems with reverse engineering. 
Gaining patents and information does not encompass the full picture of technological 
innovation. There are still significant entry barriers for Chinese specialists since they 
still lack the level of resources, the ability to experiment, and the institutional 
knowledge used by potential rivals (Gilli, 2018). This threat of attack also creates a 
significant economic disadvantage when facing Chinese companies which do not have 
the same burdens of attack. This lack of cyber threat is partially due to the "Great 
Firewall," which provides a base level of protection due to the closed nature of their 
internet service. There is also less incentive to attack Chinese companies since they 
still technologically lag behind comparable western institutions (Cheng, 2019). 
Therefore, there is less incentive for other actors to engage in cyber attacks against 
Chinese tech businesses. 

	 In Russia's case, there is little evidence that Russia gains any economic benefit 
from its continued cyber campaigns. This lack of economic benefit is mostly due to 
their target choices, primarily government institutions rather than private companies 
(CSIS, 2020). Russia also does not have the same incentives due to its lack of a 
developed technology sector (Hanson, 2019). Russia's pursuit of more active-based 
attacks garners far more public attention, resulting in severe economic consequences. 
Western democratic states have far more of an incentive to reveal these active cyber 
attacks on their institutions due to policies of freedom of information and democratic 
accountability. Russia, due to its continuous attacks on U.S. governmental institutions 
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resulting in harsh economic sanctions (U.S. Treasury, 2018). These sanctions directly 
state that: 

"Treasury intends to impose additional CAATSA sanctions, informed by our intelligence 
community, to hold Russian government officials and oligarchs accountable for their 
destabilizing activities by severing their access to the U.S. financial system." (U.S. 
Treasury, 2018)

Any attack on private institutions has been minimal, mostly targeting fossil fuel 
competitors (CSIS, 2020). There can be a clear line between a hindrance to economic 
progress and access due to their increased use of active cyber attacks against 
Western states. 

	 The preliminary conclusion drawn from the economic incentives analysis 
provides a compelling reason as to why China engaged in passive-based cyber 
attacks; however, it lacks any explanation of why Russia would engage in active 
attacks. This conclusion is due to the clear economic dis-incentive that Russia faces 
when engaging in their active attacks. They received no economic benefit, 
demonstrating more harm than benefit to their economic growth. That leads to the 
conclusion that there must be another factor at play that might explain the differences 
in attacks. It also does not explain why China does not favour active attacks alongside 
its passive cyber campaigns. China could still engage in active attacks against 
government institutions without losing its economic power due to the global 
community's reliance on its continued manufacturing dominance and central position 
in the global economy. China cannot be isolated in the same way that Russia is due to 
its growing economic power as the second largest or largest domestic economy 
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(Worldbank, 2019). At the same time, Russia still trails behind comparably smaller 
states like Italy in their global economic weight (Worldbank, 2018). 

Table 5. Results of Economic Factors and the Impacts on Cyber Strategy  
	 

	 Relative International Power 

	 Another possible factor in explaining why states pursue different cyber 
strategies is relative international power. A state's position in the international hierarchy 
can change the incentive structure for the respective state to engage in differing 
policies, especially if a state going against international consensus, and the established 
rules-based liberal regime (Mearsheimer, 2014). A low position in the international 
hierarchy increases the incentives for a state to pursue more aggressive and 
asymmetrical strategies. The three indicators are not the only possible frames of 
analysis but are the most common found in the literature. This analysis provides a 
Results of Economic Factors 
and the Impacts on Cyber 
Strategy
China (Passive Cyber Attacks) Russia (Active Cyber Attacks)
Institutions attacked?
Private X







Yes X (But limited)
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broad overview of how states respond to the international community and its relations 






	 China's position within the international hierarchy has changed significantly 
since the advent of state cyber attack strategies. China's rise in the international order 
has been predicted since the days of Napoleon. However, in the past two decades, 
China has risen to become a new prominent global power. During the 20th century, 
China remained isolated due to its communist ruling party and documented human 
rights abuses (U.S. Department of State, 2019). However, in the 21st century, China 
has taken a far more central role to the international community. The Tiananmen 
sanctions imposed on China in 1989 by the western international community have 
lessened in importance, and the US has become China's largest trading partner 
(Austin, 2014; Cheng, 2019). These sanctions initially restricted the sales of arms to 
China but did not affect other sectors of the economy (Austin, 2014). The current U.S. 
sanctions state: 

"The United States government maintains a prohibition on exporting defense articles 
and defense services to China under the general authority granted to the President and 
Secretary of State to control the import and export of such goods and services in the 
context of U.S. foreign policy, as well as pursuant to the Tiananmen 
Sanctions" (Congressional Report, 2006)
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The reliance on China's manufacturing created an environment where the U.S. and 
western states could not fully isolate China from the international community. Instead, 
it focused on the trade of arms, which helped cause the massacre (Austin, 2014). In 
2008, China was fully embraced into the international community by hosting the 
Olympics - widely seen as China's "coming out party," establishing them as a firm pillar 
of the international order. While some sanctions are still in place by the international 
community, especially western NATO members, they have minimal effect on continued 
economic and political integration of China into the international community. Due to 
this integration, China does not have the same incentive to outwardly break 
international conventions and reshape the global community to their benefit. 

	 Russia has taken an opposite trajectory to China's position in the global 
hierarchy. Russia has always faced restrictions and isolation from the international 
community for similar reasons to China. However, after the Soviet Union's dissolution, 
Russia was quickly embraced by the Western world to integrate the state within the 
capitalist economic order (Lunde, 2014). This warmth between NATO member states 
and Russia began to change rapidly after the ascension of Vladimir Putin to the 
presidency of the Russian Federation. In 2008, Russia engaged in an attack against its 
neighbour Georgia establish and maintain the puppet state of South Ossetia. While this 
created international consternation - it did not overall affect the relationship established 
between Russia and NATO due to their coordination to combat Islamic terrorism. 
However, in 2014 this changed significantly with the Russian annexation of the Crimean 
peninsula and the subsequent support of eastern Ukrainian separatists. This attack 
provoked a significant reaction from NATO member states with the establishment of 
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several condemning statements from the U.N. and the U.S. They adopted a resolution 
that: 

"urg(es) the Russian Federation to withdraw its military forces from Crimea and end its 
temporary occupation of Ukraine's territory without delay" (U.N., 2019)

	 Russia was also removed from the economic group: G8 (now G7) in response to 
their territorial grab. The annexation of the Crimea violated U.N. law in territorial 
acquisition and violation of Ukraine's sovereignty (U.N., 1949). These denouncements 
were followed by significant economic sanctions targeting their energy-exporting 
markets. After these sanctions, Russia's subsequent cyber attacks on the Democratic 
National Convention and U.S. voting records in 2016 resulted in a strong response 
from the Obama administration. The sanctions created further isolation from the 
international community and caused significant damage to Russia's economy 
(Congressional Research, 2020). From 2014 onward, Russia has been increasingly 
isolated from the international community, driven by the NATO member states to 
condemn and reverse Russia's blatant land grab. This isolation from the international 
community demonstrates that Russia faces a new incentive to ignore the international 
community due to its limits to punish Russia's actions. It also demonstrates Russia's 
use of active cyber attacks in the 2014 Ukrainian annexation and the 2016 Democratic 
National Convention (DNC) hacks. Without fear of any more repercussions from the 





	 The next indicator is the reliance of either state on international trade within the 
global economy. As stated previously, China is integrated into the international global 
markets as a hub on manufacturing and a growing tech giant, with the ability to 
compete against more technologically advanced economies. In 2001, China was 
accepted into the WTO, initially excluded due to continuing disputes with Taiwan and 
its human rights records (WTO, 2001). Since then, China has grown to encompass 
13.5% of global exports (CSIS, 2018; Worldbank 2019). It is abundantly clear that 
China's growth and its domestic economy is heavily reliant on international trade and 
maintaining a working relationship with NATO member states. China currently 
maintains a significant trade imbalance with the US, which gives them leverage against 
the US and provides an element of risk since China relies on a single market (CSIS, 
2018; US Census, 2020). Western businesses still face the risk of theft by engaging 
with the Chinese market; however, the risks associated with information theft are not 
enough to dissuade companies from investing in China's rapidly growing economy 
(NPR, 2019). China's trade is facing competition with lower-wage markets, which can 
provide the same manufacturing resources with a cheaper labour cost (Cheng, 2019). 
China is beginning to focus on creating its service and consumer economy within the 
country. The 11th Five Year Plan outlined China's priorities to shift towards a service-
based economy to maintain its economic growth to offset the competition faced within 
the manufacturing markets (Fravel, 2019). With this change, China might become less 
reliant on international trade, but it will take decades for the manufacturing trade 
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imbalances to shift away from China's favour. This economic structure maintains 
China's incentive to work within the liberal world order and not break norms to invite 
sanctions or condemnation (Mearsheimer, 2010). However, western governments are 
turning a blind eye to several ongoing human rights violations, due to their reliance 
upon an economically stable China. 

	 Russia is engaged in international trade in energy exports and natural resource 
extraction. Europe remains reliant upon Russia's natural gas exports to supply the EU's 
ever-growing energy demands. Over 50% of their exports are either unrefined and 
refined crude oil or natural gas (Worldbank, 2019). Russia however, still retains a 
positive trade balance with most of its international partners. Europe's reliance on 
Russian energy exports has led the EU to attempt to diversify and seek other markets 
to provide them with their energy needs such as Saudi Arabia, the US and other OPEC 
countries (CRS, 2006; Kim, 2014). Russia's economy is heavily reliant on international 
trade. However, due to the majority of their income from natural resources, they are 
subject to changes in commodity prices. Commodity prices can drastically shift, 
resulting in volatile economic output. In the face of western sanctions, Russia can 
export their goods due to the high demand for hydrocarbons and the availability of 
markets in the Global South (Worldbank, 2019). These markets in the Global South are 
less restricted and care less about international norms than their western counterparts. 
This reliance on international trade is a large part of Russia's economy. Russia remains 
reasonably immune to economic sanctions since many European NATO members and 
other states remain reliant on their energy demands (Kim, 2014). This immunity allows 
them a certain amount of leeway to pursue far more aggressive actions than other 
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states, which could be isolated from the international community, such as Iran. The 
immunity to international condemnation results in different incentives since they wish to 
change their position within the international hierarchy. Russia can operate outside of 
the established international conventions and laws without more repercussions. The 
lack of repercussions provides more incentive to engage in more active cyber attacks 
without the fear of international blowback. 

Territorial Disputes 
	 Both states have outstanding territorial disputes with neighbouring states. 
However, China and Russia's approaches have been significantly different in their 
attempts to resolve these issues. China currently has multiple outstanding territorial 
disputes with many of its neighbours. The most prominent territorial dispute is the 
island of Taiwan, functioning as a separate state even though the Chinese government 
considers it its province. Another major territorial dispute China faces is its maritime 
borders in the South China Sea (Hayton, 2014). This stretch of ocean colloquially 
known as the "cow's tongue" is claimed by six other countries. This dispute has not 
stopped China from building military bases throughout the smaller island chains within 
the area to secure their position (Hayton, 2014). The final major territorial dispute is the 
Sendaku Islands currently administered by Japan. This claim goes back to the first 
Sino-Japanese war and remains a sore point in the relations between the two countries 
(Hayton, 2014). In pursuing territorial claims, China does not engage in conventional 
warfare to annex these regions, preferring to engage in a long diplomatic dance with 
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the respective countries (Fravel, 2018). They do not push these claims outright out of 
fear of a conventional response upon their mainland. In all these three cases, China has 
not responded conventionally due to the protection of the US. The US has defensive 
policies with many states around China to reduce its potential expansion (Hayton, 
2014; Fravel, 2018). This cordoning forces China to engage in intelligence gathering 
and information warfare to gain a strategic edge against these possible combatants in 
the event of a defensive war (Fravel, 2018; Cheng, 2019). China uses passive cyber 
attacks for intelligence gathering and hacking the disputing governments to gain 
information on how to delay UN sanctions and win international court cases (Hayton, 
2014; Cheng, 2019). They firmly maintain the norms established in 1945 of no 
aggressive territorial gain. However, there are isolated cases within the South China 
Sea of aggressive actions against civilian fishing vessels (Hayton, 2014). These 
territorial claims create a policy of information gathering through cyber attacks to delay 
or stall any international attempts to combat their gradual expansion of influence into 
disputed territories. 

	 Russia pursues an entirely different policy when facing territorial disputes. They 
often engage using conventional warfare to either gain their territory or sponsor an 
internal rebellion with their military support (Delcour, 2014). This policy was 
demonstrated by the 2008 invasion of Georgia and South Ossetia. This internal 
conflict, encouraged by Russia, provided a context for the Russian military to engage. 
The most infamous recent territorial dispute Russia faces is the annexation of the 
Crimean peninsula and their sponsored invasion of eastern Ukraine. In both cases, 
Russia used its cyber capabilities to engage in active attacks against opposing state 
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institutions to help their conventional military invasion (Connell, 2017). Russia's use of 
their conventional military to back up their international claims is a clear violation of UN 
law, and the norms of sovereignty established in 1945. Due to the lack of following 
international norms, Russia does not hesitate to use active cyber attacks against 
defending states and western states since they have already proven they can violate 
international norms and laws without severe repercussions. Russia currently maintains 
several unrecognized puppet states in several neighbouring countries like South 
Ossetia, Transnistria and Nagorno Karabach (Delcour, 2014). They have created a 
stalemate in these conflicts but have achieved their goals of claiming their disputed 
territory in practice, if not in writing. The aggressive pursuit of their international claims 
using hybrid conflict creates an established experience in engaging in active cyber 
attacks that other states do not have. 

	 In analyzing a state's relative power in the international regime, China and 
Russia occupy significantly different positions. China maintains the international order 
and rules-based society since it remains a net benefit to their overall economic growth 
even if it hinders their territorial expansion. However, Russia shucks the conventions of 
international relations by using their conventional and non-conventional military assets 
to either expand their territory or weaken their perceived international rivals. At the 
same time, the dependence on their natural resource exports provides them with a 
layer of protection. On the other hand, China has grown in the rules-based order and 
has no desire to drastically alter the international regime since it remains a beneficiary 
of the system. Russia's inability to maintain international conventions is a compelling 
argument to explain why they engage in active cyber attacks. The repercussions of 
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such attacks would not be any more severe than the current sanctions they face. 
However, it does not fully explain why China favours a passive cyber strategy since 
they retain an even more central position within the international world order. China can 
weather any international condemnation and due to its centrality to the world 
economy. 

Table 6. Results of International Power and the Impact on Cyber Strategy  
Institutional Organization 

	 The institutions a state constructs for its cyber capabilities are critical in 
determining how a state will carry out its cyber-attack strategy. China and Russia have 
a commonality of historical communist institutions and similar concerns about 
Results of International Power 
and the Impact on Cyber 
Strategy
China (Passive Cyber Attacks) Russia (Active Cyber Attacks)
Is the state isolated? 
Yes X
No X









investing in technological progress due to their authoritarian structures. However, the 
modern organizational natures of China and Russia are significantly different, and this 
is a compelling factor as to why these two states pursue differing strategies. There is a 
possible issue of endogeny, but the allocation of budgets, the institutional organization 
and availability of human capital are independent of cyber attack strategy. This 
difference in budget use is due to the possibility of resources and institutions used 
differently depending on the state. It is not a guarantee that a larger budget implies that 
a state can carry out more sophisticated cyber attacks. At the same time, the scale and 
capabilities of each state's investments create two different perspectives in the most 
efficient way to organize their cyber institutions—each looking for the most effective 
results in their cyber attacks compared to their available resources. The base 
assumption is that if institutional organization is a significant factor in cyber attack 
strategy, the actor with high investment, distinct organizations, and the most human 
capital would carry out the more complicated active cyber attacks over passive cyber 
attacks. 

Allocation of the Budget  
	 The first indicator is the declared budget. China has a declared cybersecurity 
budget of approximately 7.35 billion dollars, mostly spent on hardware capacity over 
software and human capital (Worldbank, 2020; Xinhua, 2019). This declared budget by 
Chinese state media is disputed by multiple military analysts claiming that this could 
underrepresent their budgets by approximately 30% (CSIS, 2020). This estimation by 
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policy experts is mostly speculative. China's military budget is the second-largest and 
publicly declared at 177 billion dollars. Still, several industry experts expect that this is 
an under-representation of their total military spending (Worldbank 2020; China Daily, 
2019). Several institutes put the overall military spending in China at approximately 239 
billion dollars, increasing almost a third (CSIS, 2020). While China itself reported to the 
UN that they spend approximately 133 billion dollars (UN, 2018), these differing figures 
create confusion around what is the correct military budget of China. However, there is 
no universally accepted standard for reporting military budgets, since civilian spending 
can often mask areas that are mainly used to assist the military budget. These 
estimates create a window of spending between 133 billion dollars to 239 billion 
dollars, with several field experts that the figures could be far higher. These differing 
figures provided by the Chinese government are also part of a strategy to confuse their 
adversaries on the military's actual capabilities. Another report has also claimed that 
China is slowing down on its increase in military spending due to its slow economic 
growth in recent years (Fravel, 2018). However, there is no solid confirmation that this is 
the case. With such a high military budget and the second-highest allocated spending 
toward cyber capabilities, it can be determined that China's cyber capabilities are vast, 
with very few limitations. This high budget would lead to the assumption that China 
would be able to carry out sophisticated, active cyber attacks; however, they do not 
pursue this strategy. 

	 Russia is very cagey with their military and cyber-security spending. There are 
few official figures and many estimates, which creates a smokescreen to hide 
capabilities. The most consistently reported number allocated specifically to their cyber 
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capabilities is approximately 250 million dollars; however, that figure is merely an 
estimate (Crane, 2019). Russia's military budget is officially reported at 65.1 billion 
dollars, which, compared to its economy, is a far higher percentage than China's 
(SIPRI, 2020). However, estimates put the official figure much higher at almost three 
times that cost at 150-180billion dollars (Kofman, 2019). Another issue with 
determining the specific cyber-security budget is Russia's involvement and reliance 
upon criminal elements to help carry out specific attacks. There are no official 
statements, even acknowledging this possibility from the Russian government. This 
use of third party criminal actors is highly documented despite Russian denials. Russia 
has funded several criminal cyber-attack groups like FancyBear, CozyBear and 
EnergeticBear (Ortiz, 2020). There are no accurate estimates of Russia's spending on 
these operations due to its clandestine nature and the inability to identify many of these 
criminal attacks as state-sponsored. There is compelling circumstantial evidence that 
does make Russia the most likely actor funding these groups. Russia is facing a 
reduction in the estimated percentage of GDP spent on military assets in Russia due to 
their stagnant economy, and the reliance upon primary resource extraction and the 
fluctuating commodities market (SIPRI, 2020; Crane, 2019). Even with these shaky 
estimates, the window of allocated costs is still far lower than their neighbour China, 
mostly due to the size of each respective state economy.  
Organization Division 
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	 The next indicator of institution organization is the division of institutions and the 
allocation of tasks. China does have delineated branches of government specifically 
focused on its cyber-security capabilities, but it does not eliminate the possibility of 
spillover into other governmental organizations (Fravel, 2017; Cheng 2019). The public 
face of China's cybersecurity capabilities is the Cyberspace Administration of China. 
This organization's mandate is to protect Chinese cyberspace and regulate the 
information through censorship and the promotion of state propaganda. While China 
does not engage in offensive capabilities outwardly, it does covert assistance to 
multiple cyber attacks (Cheng, 2019). The most infamous organization is the PLA Unit 
61398, which has been accused by several NATO member states of carrying out 
several cyber attacks against private businesses and US military capabilities (Cheng, 
2019; Dept of Justice, 2014; Mandiant Report, 2014). 

"The indictment alleges that the defendants (5 members of PLA Unit 61398) conspired 
to hack into American entities, to maintain unauthorized access to their computers and 
to steal information from those entities that would be useful to their competitors in 
China, including state-owned enterprises (SOEs). … it alleges, the conspirators also 
stole sensitive, internal communications that would provide a competitor, or an 
adversary in litigation, with insight into the strategy and vulnerabilities of the American 
entity." (Dept of Justice, 2014)

This unit of the People's Liberation Army is officially not acknowledged by the Chinese 
government, and it folded into the military institution. There is also another Unit, PLA 
Unit 61486, identified by the US National Security Administration, which accuses this 
unit of several attacks against several industry leaders in the US (CrowdStrike, 2014). 
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The Ministry of State Security of China also has been accused of fostering several 
groups responsible for cyber attacks on the US Navy and Japanese Universities 
(Cheng, 2019). From this available information, China has an established hierarchy and 
division of tasks within the specific institution of the Cyberspace Administration; 
however, there are multiple cases of cyber attacks being carried out from other state 
departments and the military. China does have a clear hierarchy; it still is undermined in 
an attempt to diversify where their attacks come from to help confuse their adversaries. 
This lack of clear delineation demonstrates that China does not maintain a clear 
separation of mandates, but it still has specific institutions to deal with cybersecurity. 

	 Russia, on the other hand, has no clear administration set up to maintain its 
cybersecurity operations. Russia has its offensive and defensive military institutions 
that do not focus on maintaining the Russian state's cybersecurity. However, Russia 
does have the Foreign Intelligence Service, which is involved in several disinformation 
campaigns against the US and NATO allies (Lunde, 2014; Valeriano, 2019). The main 
issue with trying to determine the cybersecurity organization in Russia is the reliance 
upon third-party actors (grey hats) to carry out most of their cyber attacks. These 
groups are often criminals who are engaging in cyber attacks for criminal purposes, 
which are then hired by the Russian government (Lunde, 2014; Jasper, 2017; Klimburg, 
2013). These groups are often unaware that they are in the employ of the Russian 
government due to the clandestine nature of the criminal cyber world and the Russian 
government. The most famous attacks from Russia, such as FancyBear and Guccifer 
against the DNC, were carried out by private entities in North Macedonia and Serbia 
(Valeriano, 2019). The Russian government did not directly carry out these attacks, but 
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they still count as Russian operations even if the attackers are ignorant of their 
benefactor's overall goals (Jasper, 2017). This lack of organization clarity demonstrates 
that while Russia focuses on carrying out large-scale, active cyber attacks, it is often 
not carried out directly by state operatives. By doing so, Russia can maintain a 
distance from these damaging attacks while maintaining enough deniability to avoid 
the worst consequences of the international community. This behaviour is in contrast 
to the theoretical model since with a lack of organizational clarity, Russia would only be 
able to carry out less sophisticated passive attacks.

Availability of Human Capital  
	 China's availability of human capital is an advantage of pursuing cyber attacks 
due to its large population. Along with such an endless supply of potential workers, 
China engages in an aggressive campaign to increase computer literacy to increase the 
potential pool of possible recruits (Fravel, 2017). One of their major campaigns is with 
its university programs at the University of Shanghai and the University of Shenzen 
(Cheng, 2019). Both universities created specific programs designed to educate 
students in the skills required to increase China's cyber literate recruitment pool. These 
programs are tailored explicitly for government recruitment and increasing the skills-set 
for cyber activities. It is estimated that China currently has between 50 000-100 000 
individuals assisting their cyber-warfare campaigns spread out over multiple 
institutions. These individuals work in private companies, government departments and 
military units (Foreign Policy, 2010). There is also a significant portion of students 
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studying at western institutions to gain knowledge and skillsets to bring back to China 
for the state's advantage. This use of western education can prove a disadvantage 
since there is a particular problem with the concept of "brain drain," where students 
leave China to study abroad and do not return for China to reap the benefits (Cheng, 
2019). The problem of "brain drain" is reducing in significance since many students are 
returning to China to pursue their careers. Mostly due to China's economy broadening 
beyond a manufacturing-based economy towards a tertiary, service-based economy 
(Cheng, 2019). This diversified economy provides China with a large pool of possible 
human capital to carry out its cyber campaigns. With a pool of highly educated 
workers, China has a greater capacity to carry out destructive, active cyber attacks; 
however, it still focuses primarily on intelligence gathering passive cyber attacks. 

	 Russia, however, faces an inverse problem of a significant lack of human capital. 
Russia is still a large state with a respectable population; however, the education levels 
are low (Lunde, 2014). This lack of human capital is partially due to Russia's focus on 
natural resource extraction, and lack of investment in education focused on its 
technology sector. Their educational programs are not focused on increasing their 
computer technology skillset. There are specific programs at the University of Moscow, 
and St Petersburg tailored for government cyber recruitments; these programs are 
lacking compared to competing Western and Chinese universities (Jasper, 2017). This 
lack of education creates a reliance on western education institutions, where Russia 
send their students to learn. The hope is they will return and bring back their learned 
knowledge. However, Russia is a prominent victim of the "brain drain," where many of 
the students who leave choose not to return, losing some of its best possible students 
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to western state emigration (Lunde, 2014). This lack of education and supply of 
possible recruits creates a unique situation where Russia often relies on third-party 
non-state actors to help carry out their cyber attacks (Jasper, 2017). While these third 
parties are available to the highest bidder, it does carry some risk if these third party 
actors go rogue and fail to carry out the attempted attack. Contrary to the assumption, 
this lack of human capital does not hinder Russia's use of active cyber attacks.

	 The initial intuitive analysis would be that China would be able to carry out far 
more damaging active cyber attacks since they require significant resources. However, 
Russia is the dominant actor when discussing active cyber attacks (Carr, 2012; Jasper, 
2017). China's availability of resources, human capital and more clearly delineated 
institutional structure assume that it can engage in these large scale active cyber 
attacks. However, China focuses on continuous and large-scale passive attacks to gain 
proprietary information. Russia focuses fewer resources on fewer attacks, but these are 
active cyber attacks with large-scale repercussions for the defending state. This focus 
on active cyber attacks also could be due to their reliance on third-party actors; 
however, there does not seem to be a specialty for these third party actors to carry out 
either active or passive cyber attacks (Lunde, 2014; Klimburg 2013). Russia might also 
attempt to focus their limited resources on getting the "biggest bang for their buck." In 
contrast, China can spend generously on maintaining large-scale, continuous passive 
cyber campaigns. However, in this analysis, it can be concluded that the institutional 




Table 7. Results of International Organization Impact on Cyber Strategy  
Interpretation of Deterrence  
	 Cyber deterrence in isolation not possible due to the wide variety of possible 
attack angles, as well as the problems of attribution (Liblicki, 2009). The main issue is 
that cyber attacks break down one of the three essential components of deterrence: 
credibility. This break down is due to the problems of attribution and discovery 
highlighted previously. However, this does not mean that cyber capabilities cannot be 
used as a tool for general deterrence policy. There is severe difficulty in creating a 
cyber deterrence policy that can be as effective as possible when defending against 
actors that cannot be identified (Davis, 2015). These three outlined indicators provide 
Results of International 
Organization Impact on Cyber 
Strategy





Specific institutions for cyber 
security 
X
Merged into other government 
institutions 
X X




essential context or how Russia and China interpret the novel concepts of cyber 
deterrence. Analyzing their interpretations of deterrence in the cyber context provides a 
critical demonstration of how they engage with this new context.  
Historical Threats and Deterrence 

	 China's current defence policy is "winning local wars under informative 
conditions.” (Fravel, p201, 2017) This policy was adopted in 2004, changing from their 
policy of "local wars under high technology conditions" (Fravel, p 202, 2017; CCP, 
2004). This change of emphasis in their policies demonstrates their increased capacity 
to use their new cyber capabilities and maintains a through-line of information 
dominance over potential opponents. Historically, China has been mostly concerned 
with facing external threats, drawing back to their "century of humiliation" where 
colonial powers invaded China to gain beneficial trade arrangements. Then, China 
faced with invasion by their Japanese neighbours (Fravel, 2017). After all of that 
conflict, China dealt with the threat of intervention by capitalist and rival communist 
powers and attempts to reinstate the Taiwanese government over the ruling communist 
party. This history of conflict has led to China focusing on their defensive position to 
maintain its government, and territorial integrity. "Active defence," established in 1980 
has been the policy on which all other modern defensive and deterrence policy has 
been based (Fravel, 2017; Cheng, 2019). Active defence is a concept based on actively 
maintaining information dominance over their rivals, and responding to their gathered 
information to prevent any wars from being engaged outside of the term of China. This 
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policy of information gathering to maintain the strategic advantage goes back to the 
writings of SunTzu and carried through in Mao's policies in the civil war, and 
establishment of the communist state. Mao always emphasized engaging with the 
enemy on his terms and avoiding any situation which could be disadvantageous to 
their chances of winning. Mao states: 

"Without preparedness, superiority is not real superiority and there can be no initiative 
either. Having grasped this point, a force that is inferior but prepared can often defeat a 
superior enemy by surprise attack." (On Protracted War, 1938)

His policy remains consistent in modern Chinese military thought. By pursuing a policy 
of "winning local wars under informatized conditions," information gathering and 
preparation provide the advantage in positioning themselves to protect against 
becoming involved in any conflict, which could be detrimental to the maintenance of 
the Chinese Communist Regime (Fravel, 2017, p 220). Regarding their cyberattack 
strategy, the information gathering provided is key to maintaining the strategic 
advantage and increasing their investment in the high tech sector. This strategy 
naturally ties to their historical application of deterrence through superior information 
gathering. By engaging in passive attacks, China can maintain its information 
superiority to assist in its attempts to only engage in conflict on their terms. 

	 Russian defensive policy is based currently on the concept of conventional 
deterrence by maintaining a large offensive capability to discourage any status from 
violating territorial integrity. In interpreting the deterrence, Russia is far more eager to 
demonstrate its capabilities for credibility (Herspring, 1987; Kofman, 2019). Historically, 
this policy is consistent from the USSR to modern Russian strategic thought. Russia, 
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like China, is also concerned with external threats over internal threats. Russia 
emphasizes the capabilities and credibility of its active cyber attacks by demonstrating 
its use whenever possible. Demonstrating their capabilities communicates to other rival 
states the legitimacy of Russia's threats. When regarding deterrence, Russia's policy is 
to demonstrate their outward capabilities to discourage any possible attack, cyber or 
otherwise. Russian foreign policy is based on the realist perspective, of might makes 
right. Russia does not trust the international institutions and the liberal order to 
maintain their security (Jasper, 2017). This distrust is both true in the modern era, and 
also during the Soviet regime. The outward-looking defensive policy has been in place 
since the communist revolution and the initial state goals of spreading communist 
across the world to overthrow the capitalist powers. Russia always viewed themselves 
under existential threat from capitalist powers, relied on using deterrence to maintain 
their security. Communist General Ogarkov emphasizes the necessity to adapt the 
Russian military to the modern conditions and embrace technological change and shift 
their priority away from the reliance on nuclear weapons. This policy included an 
emphasis on "weapons based on new physical principles.” (Fravel, 2017, p. 203) While 
he did not live to see cyber weapons - this shows incredible prescience on the future of 
how Russia would best move forward to increase capabilities in the computer era 
(Fitzgerald, 1986). Gareev also focused on incorporating new technologies in the 
Russian military, and puts a particular emphasis on information gathering, but also 




"Major attention will be paid to the perfection of conventional precision weapons, with 
primary development not of defensive, but of offensive assault means, as being the 
most effective and economic." (Gareev, 2013, p. 49)

Russian deterrence policy is more based on demonstrating their capabilities to deter 
other possible attacks by enhancing the credibility of possible retaliatory attacks - 
coming for the Russian concept of "ustrashenie," literally translated to 
"intimidation" (Ven Bruusgaard, 2016, p. 8). In 2014 Russia introduced a new concept 
of non-nuclear deterrence defined as 

"a complex of foreign policy, military and military-technical measures, aimed at the 
prevention of non-nuclear aggression" (Ven Bruusgaard, 2016, p. 21). 

This policy put specific emphasis on fighting "remote" wars using their asymmetric 
capabilities to prevent any attacks on their contiguous states. Active cyber attacks 
contribute to this outstanding policy by engaging in active attacks against rival states. 
The defending state becomes more focused on protecting themselves and their 
interests than on pushing back against Russian influence. This application of Russia's 
historical concept of deterrence to cyber capabilities is demonstrated in their attacks 
by its significant rivals: the EU and the US.

Credibility of Current Perceived Threats  
	 The perceived threat is another key indicator of how a state would engage in 
cyber capabilities since it links to the concept of credibility in regards to deterrence. 
China's perceived credible threats are more focused on maintaining its territorial 
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integrity. There is some variation in the credible threats China faces, but China is most 
concerned with maintaining territorial integrity. Since 1994, China has viewed its 
international position as the most secure since the establishment of the communist 
regime (Fravel, 2017). This perceived security allows China to relax its defensive 
posture. After the establishment of the communist regime, they faced the threat of 
NATO invasion from Taiwan or the Korean War. Currently, China focuses mostly on the 
possibility of smaller local conflicts in neighbouring states rather than a full-blown 
invasion (Fravel, 2017). While they do have intimidating rivals close to their borders 
such as Russia, Japan and the US, they are comfortable in the realization that any war 
carried out against them from these states would be so devastating to both parties that 
most would avoid it (Fravel, 2017; Cheng, 2019). China is currently a rising power, and 
are now the second most powerful state in close competition with the US. Due to this 
lack of a credible existential threat to their state regime, they can relax their armed 
stance. They have downgraded their large military to a more manageable size, in an 
attempt to increase their efficiency and reduce the burden on the state's economy 
(Fravel, 2017; Cheng 2019). This downgrade of military investment demonstrates that 
China faces a low credible threat from external actors. The most existential threat to 
the Chinese regime is its domestic political control. Due to their authoritarian structure 
and censorship, they face credible threats from an increasingly educated population 
and a growing middle class. These factors cause the state to invest far more heavily 
into cyber capabilities, not just to defend their state against outside attackers but also 
to monitor and maintain party control over their population (Cheng, 2019). 
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	 Russia's perceived credible threats are far more numerous and considered a 
more existential issue to the federation's maintenance. The numerous threats are also 
due to Russia's international goals of regaining some of the power they lost during the 
Soviet collapse (Lunde, 2014). Russia is also distrusting Western institutions, partially 
due to the Soviet regime's precipitated collapse, helped along by NATO. The 
incorporation of the Baltic and eastern European states into NATO created a fear that 
Russia itself could be incorporated into the western NATO block, becoming a puppet 
state for US interests (Jasper, 2017; Lunde, 2014). This distrust was compounded due 
to the NATO intervention during the 2012 Libyan civil war by using the pretext of setting 
up a no-fly zone to help precipitate regime change (Jasper, 2019). Putin sees a credible 
threat of a similar conflict in which the US will use the pretext of humanitarian aid to 
help overthrow Russia's authoritarian regime (Shlapentokh, 2009; Hill, 2013). This fear 
of regime change has caused Russia to pursue active cyber attacks and information 
warfare in their successful attempt to distract the US from their international concerns, 
and slowly dividing Europe away from both the US protection and to question the EU's 
ability to maintain European peace and prosperity (Jasper, 2019; Ingram, 2001). 
Russia's fear also comes from the overarching liberal international institutions such as 
the UN, which on multiple occasions, has denounced their actions, especially in 
response to their invasion of Crimea and the subsequent support of Ukrainian 
separatists. This attack is due to the Maidan revolution in Ukraine, and its stated 
intention to join NATO and the EU to protect themselves against Russian influence. 
This policy shift is a significant violation of Russian security interests and an 
unacceptable position for the regime's maintenance. The slow crawl of NATO towards 
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the borders created the incentive to pursue aggressive actions and demonstrates a 
high level of a credible threat to Russia's interests both locally and abroad.  
Communication 
	 Authoritarian states often hesitate to admit weaknesses, and acknowledging 
cyber attacks demonstrates that authoritarian states are not invulnerable (Carr, 2012). 
When an authoritarian state admits weakness, it provides a window into the state's 
deterrence communication. When a state admits a cyber threat, it helps determine 
when a state will use communication when facing significant threats. China faces 
multiple continuous cyber campaigns against its government and private institutions. 
However, they are protected by its "great firewall" but still face most cyber attacks out 
of any state (Cheng, 2019). The Chinese government does not often admit specific 
cyber attacks against their institutions. China has acknowledged cyber attacks, but 
they never specify where or when these attacks and the targeted institutions. Unlike 
democratic states committed to freedom of information, China does not have the same 
compulsion to be transparent to its citizens or the international community. Most of the 
attacks they receive are internet scams used to steal basic information for minor 
financial gain (Cheng, 2019). Other attacks from rival states might be happening, but 
China remains tight-lipped in admitting possible weaknesses. China wishes to maintain 
its perception as a technological leader, maintaining a strict security regime. There are 
multiple attacks carried against China from their neighbouring rival states with territorial 
disputes. Vietnam and India are particular states that attack Chinese state institutions, 
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often to gain information to help protect their interests in the South China Sea and the 
Indian-Chinese borders (CSIS, 2020). China and Chinese state-run companies regularly 
accuse the US of engaging in cyber attacks against Chinese interests (Zetter, 2010; 
Lecher, 2019). Passive cyber attacks are easier to maintain deniability and 
demonstrates China’s more relaxed international posture. China does not fear being 
perceived as weak, and can admit when it faces challenges in the cyber realm. These 
accusations against the US also help boost the regime’s domestic perception, 
providing proof that the state is being treated unfairly by the international community. 

	 Russia is similar in its authoritarian instincts but does not give official reports of 
cyber attacks against their institutions. The few attacks reported by NGOs are attacks 
from North Korean hackers against several Russian business interests, but not against 
their state functions (CSIS, 2020). There have been attacks against Russia from China 
as well, focusing on business interests rather than attacking state functions (CSIS, 
2020). One of the issues that face attackers targeting Russia is that their state 
functions are not as directly reliant on computer technology as the Chinese 
government (Lunde, 2014). Russia does not officially admit that it faces attacks from 
the US or other international actors. Communicating that they are under constant 
attack has the risk of admitting state weakness. Russia perceives itself to be in a far 
more precarious position than China, therefore, and admission of weakness is 
dangerous to the legitimacy of the regime. Russia maintains the norm of authoritarian 
states in either entirely denying or never acknowledging any state's weaknesses. In 
2019 there was multiple reporting of cyber attacks against Russian energy grids from 
the US (NYT, 2019). Russia has not even mentioned these attacks publicly. This 
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example shows that Russia uses communication differently than China, retaining a 
stonewall of silence.

	 The concept of deterrence is the most compelling factor to explain the 
difference in cyber attack strategy between China and Russia. China's concept of 
deterrence is far more focused on information gathering and avoiding disadvantageous 
conflicts. Russia's deterrence concept is more to distract others by creating conflicts 
from afar and demonstrating superior capabilities to deter others from attacking. 
China's focus on passive cyber attacks lines up with this concept of maintaining 
information dominance due to the primary goals of passive attacks is to gain covert 
information for the benefit of the attacker. Russia's use of active cyber attacks works 
perfectly with their interpretation of deterrence. It uses these attacks to distract rival 
states from engaging them directly while also demonstrating the possible 
consequences of a direct attack on Russian interests. This theory is demonstrated 
historically in both countries with these concepts of deterrence being espoused by 
their most influential military and foreign policy strategists. The indicator of 
acknowledged cyber attacks demonstrates that Russia prefers total silence while 
China communicates when it perceives an advantage. China is more relaxed in its 
international posture, allowing them to use more subtle tools with long term benefits 
rather than pursuing distracting attacks to maintain the regime. Overall, the concept of 
deterrence provides the best explanation for why these two states pursue differing 
strategies between active and passive cyber attacks. The other possible outlined 
factors do influence their cyber-attack strategy, but they find themselves under the 
umbrella of their interpretations of their deterrence policies. The following table 
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demonstrates how China and Russia fit perfectly within the model of how deterrence 
can influence the different between a cyber strategy which uses active or passive cyber 
attacks. 

Table 8. Results of Deterrence Interpretation on Cyber Strategy  
Results of Deterrence 
Interpretation on Cyber 
Strategy 
Passive Cyber Attacks (China) Active Cyber Attacks (Russia) 
Historical Deterrence 












	 With the advent of cyber attacks, new questions have emerged as to how and 
why states pursue differing strategies. There is a distinct lack in the literature on policy 
analysis as to why states favour specific cyber attack strategies: passive or active? In 
this paper, the question: why do states favour passive or active cyber attacks was 
discussed. Using two case studies, Russia and China, I have concluded that each 
state's interpretation of deterrence is the key factor in how each respective state 
pursues its cyber strategies. China's interpretation of an effective deterrence policy is 
focused on information gathering, and knowing the potential enemies, which aligns 
well with passive cyber attacks. Passive attacks focus mostly on information gathering 
and monitoring capabilities, which do not harm the overall functions of the attacked 
cyber networks. Russia's interpretation of deterrence, however, is fundamentally 
different. Its deterrence concept is based on proving and demonstrating its destructive 
capabilities while also distracts rival states away from key Russia interests. Russia's 
interpretation works well with the use of active cyber attacks, which focuses more on 
destroying and harming cyber networks, allowing Russia to demonstrate its capabilities 
to other states.

	 In the literature review, there is plenty of information on how states carry out 
cyber attacks from a broad conceptual standpoint and a focus down on individual 
attack case studies. However, there is a distinct lack of policy analysis on why states 
engage in specific cyber strategies. There is an analysis of individual case studies such 
as Stuxnet or FancyBear, but not an overall analysis of a state's policy goals and 
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strategy. Four key factors emerged as driving elements in how a state determines its 
cyber strategy. They are economic incentives, relative international power, institutional 
organization, and interpretation of deterrence. These four contributing factors are not 
the sole factors as to why a state engages in cyber attacks, but they are the most 
convincing for policy analysis. The general literature on cyber attacks and cyber 
strategy distinctly lacks a policy explanation as to why a state would pursue differing 
cyber attack strategies. Almost all analysis tends to focus on defence policy against 
attacks rather than the attack policy itself. 

	 Policy analysis methodology provides an accurate overview of the main 
motivating factors in how a state determines its cyber strategies. The key flaw in this 
analysis is the lack of confidential information and primary sources. Since cyber 
attacks are clandestine, the information on these attacks is unreliable. However, by 
approaching this problem from the policy side, and using documents from both NGOs, 
private institutions, and the attacking and attacked governments, a fairly accurate 
picture is created on the motivating factors behind cyber-strategy. An analysis of 
motivating factors can still be done by analyzing the states' general policies and 
inferring their clandestine activities. This study could be improved if there was access 
to classified information.

Summary of Results  
	 In this study, I have looked at four possible contenders as the major factors 
influencing cyber strategy; economic incentives, relative international power, 
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committed resources, and interpretation of deterrence policy. Economic incentives 
provide a possible explanation as to why China engages in passive cyber attacks. 
Despite these incentives, it does not adequately explain why Russia is partial to active 
attacks. Russia has a similar incentive structure for engaging in passive attacks for 
economic gain but do not engage nearly as often with passive attacks. Therefore, it is 
clear that China has a clear economic incentive to carry out passive cyber attacks, but 
Russia does not benefit from their active cyber attacks.

	 Relative international power provides a compelling explanation as to why Russia 
engages in active attacks. Russia is more internationally isolated than China and has 
more incentive to challenge the international laws and norms. However, it does not 
explain why China favours passive attacks. The three indicators, state isolation from 
the international community, reliance on international trade, and ongoing territorial 
disputes, provide an overview of how relative international power affects cyber 
strategy. These indicators highlight that Russia does not have the same incentives to 
function within the international system of norms. Therefore, Russia is more likely to 
engage in cyber attacks, which are more destructive and break international norms. 
China could engage in active attacks and have similar incentives to reshape the 
international order and challenge norms without severe consequences. However, China 
seems content with its relative international power.

	 Institutional organization is another possible explanation for why a state engages 
in either active or passive attacks. The conventional wisdom is that an active attack 
would require more resources to carry out effectively than a passive attack. The three 
indicators for allocated resources are the publicly declared resources designated 
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towards cyber capabilities and military, the next being the division of cyber institutions, 
and finally, the availability of trained human capital. The largest surprise of the research 
is Russia and China bucking the conventional wisdom, pursuing the opposite strategy 
of what their institutional organization would encourage. 

	 Finally, deterrence policy is the last possible factor and the most convincing in 
determining why China and Russia pursue passive and active strategies. The three 
indicators for deterrence policy is how a state and their prominent strategists interpret 
deterrence, next is the perceived threat to the state, and finally, how the state 
acknowledges cyber attacks against their institutions. China’s interpretation of 
deterrence is based both on their history of external imperialist invasions, followed by 
the continuous threat of capitalist intervention. Their interpretation of deterrence is 
based on gathering information and engaging the enemy on their terms after significant 
preparation and intelligence gathering. A similar fear of capitalist intervention influences 
Russia’s interpretation of deterrence. However, more recently, after the fall of the Soviet 
Union, their deterrence policy is based on maintaining their regional dominance. Russia 
believes that deterrence policy is based on intimidation by demonstrating cyber 
capabilities and distracting their international audience. The perceived threat to each 
state is also different, with China seeing themselves in a relatively secure international 
position without existential threats from the international community. Russia fears 
regime change from western governments and has been proven that their western 
neighbours cannot be trusted to allow Russia to maintain its regional influence. Finally, 
the last indicator shows how each state acknowledges that cyber attacks against their 
institutions demonstrate typical authoritarian state behaviour from each state. China is 
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more likely to admit they receive cyber attacks on their institutions without specifying 
where or when these attacks have happened. Russia engages by using both complete 
denials, afraid to admit their weaknesses to both the international community and their 
respective citizens. Interpretation of deterrence is the most convincing argument as to 
why China and Russia engage in different cyber strategies. 

Recommendations  
	 This study's recommendation is to focus on a state's interpretation of 
deterrence free of western bias. Not all states similarly interpret these concepts, 
therefore their actions will be different and often contrary to conventional wisdom. 
China and Russia's interpretation of deterrence are significantly different compared to 
the US and NATO states. Another recommendation is that in the analysis of clandestine 
activities, general non-classified state policy can be critical indicators of how a state 
uses secretive capabilities. Classified and public policies do not operate within a 
vacuum, and both contribute to each other. By analyzing both simultaneously, they can 
provide convincing explanations to actions that might seem counter-productive to 
institutions' goals, especially when institutions are not separated by mandate or law 
like western institutions. The last recommendation is for more thorough policy analysis 
of each state's theoretical sources general cyber strategy. There is significant literature 
on individual attacks or the conceptual framework of cyber capabilities, but there is 
little analysis of each state's cyber strategies policy. This lack of analysis is due to the 
novelty of these capabilities. Now that these capabilities have become a firmly 
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established tool for states and a historical record to draw upon, new conclusions of 
how these new cyber capabilities can now move away from the theoretical discussion 
to a discussion of policy and strategy.  

	 Avenues of Future Research  
	 This analysis also brings up new possible avenues of research in policy analysis 
of cyber capabilities. There is the possibility of applying this analysis to other cyber 
capable states such as North Korea, Iran, Israel, Brazil and Turkey. China and Russia 
are becoming increasingly aggressive in their pursuit of cyber capabilities and 
engaging in cyber attacks. Does the theory of deterrence interpretation work in these 
case studies? Does each state have fundamental differences in their understanding of 
deterrence policies, and does it affect their cyber actions similarly to Russia and 
China? Another possible avenue of research is a closer analysis of institutional 
organization and the use of cyber capabilities. Both China and Russia bucked the 
conventional wisdom of passive attacks using fewer resources and active attacks 
using more. Russia, which has less committed resources and less conventional 
organization, engages in more costly active attacks. China had far more resources, and 
delineated institutions are engaging in less expensive passive attacks. Is this a case of 
getting more bang for your buck and using minimal resources effectively, or is the 
conventional wisdom and analysis of cyber attacks flawed? Another question that 
stems from this study is the response of attacked states to these active or passive 
cyber attacks. Is the response of the state receiving these attacks significantly 
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different, and is retaliation a significant component to this response? Finally, the last 
question is, would this analysis be substantially changed if there was access to the 
classified material of the respective states? Would the conclusion remain similar? 
Without access, there remains a significant gap in this analysis, which could change 
the initial findings and analysis. Without this information, inference through public 
policy analysis remains the best tool. 

	 Other avenues of further research could look more closely at capabilities and 
targets and how that affects specific state cyber strategy. Does the strategy change 
based on civilian or military targets? How much does the target influence a state's 
strategy, does a state maintain consistency regardless of the target? Other areas of 
research could look into long versos short-term intentions and strategies. Does a cyber 
attack on a power plant in a combat situation have the same strategic thinking behind 
it as a disinformation campaign, or a cyber attack stealing proprietary information? 
Long-term intentions are difficult to determine. However, China and Russia have a 
continuity of administration that allows for much more long-term strategic thinking than 
democratic counterparts. Does long-term strategy change the cyber attack strategy? 
Does a state engage in more passive or hybrid cyber attacks when pursuing long term 
goals? Finally, another aspect that can be explored is each state's capabilities and how 
that determines cyber attack strategies. This research is focused mostly on intentions 
and incentives over capabilities, creating a gap that could be pursued further. Do the 
capabilities of a larger wealthy state like China influence the strategy compared to a 
more impoverished state like Russia? This problem connects to the findings that 
98
resources did not affect cyber strategy incentives, with China pursuing passive attacks 
and Russia pursuing active attacks. This research reveals plenty of new questions to 
be pursued in researching cyber attacks, and can provide the stepping off point for 
exciting new research.

	 In conclusion, a state's interpretation of the deterrence concept seems key to 
how a state will determine its cyber-attack strategy. This conclusion is due to historical 
precedent and policy leaders' views deterrence as a theory and the perceived threat to 
the state. However, this study does not discount that the other three factors can 
contribute to a state's cyber strategy. They can affect the incentives for a state to use 
cyber attacks, but it does not override deterrence priorities. The concept of deterrence 
has been around since the advent of human conflict. Key thinkers have had their 
interpretation tested throughout the centuries with the advent of new, more destructive 
technology that changes the equations of conflict. This analysis is merely another 
stepping stone, demonstrating how centuries-old theories can still influence even the 
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